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REGULATION BY DATABASE 
 
NATHAN CORTEZ* 
The federal government currently publishes 196,284 
searchable databases online, a number of which include 
information about private parties that is negative or 
unflattering in some way. Federal agencies increasingly 
publish adverse data not just to inform the public or promote 
transparency, but to pursue regulatory endsto change the 
underlying behavior being reported. Such “regulation by 
database” has become a preferred method of regulation in 
recent years, despite scant attention from policymakers, 
courts, or scholars on its appropriate uses and safeguards. 
This Article evaluates the aspirations and burdens of 
regulation by database. Based on case studies of six 
important data sets (published by the CFPB, CPSC, EPA, 
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FEC, FDA, and Medicare), the Article proposes what I call 
“Good Government Data Practices” to ensure that databases 
are reliable, useful, and fair. More optimal data disclosures 
require careful design choices that consider both data inputs 
and outputs, including how to gather and process data, how 
to characterize them, and how to present them. The article 
envisions a decidedly modern role for government agencies 
as data “stewards” rather than as mere publishers or 
repositories. 
Agency databases have proliferated on the belief that 
markets, regulation, and even democracy all require 
transparency, that sunlight is the best disinfectant. But as 
transparency has moved onlinebecoming more pervasive, 
more powerful, and more burdened with regulatory 
dimensionswe also must recognize that sunlight can blind 
or even burn. It is in this spirit that I call for policymakers to 
embrace the government’s role as a data “steward,” a sentinel 
that helps maximize the quality of data inputs and outputs 
via tailored procedures. The more reliable government data 
are, the more they can enlighten us and perhaps even deter 
unwanted behavior. 
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Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman. 
 Louis D. Brandeis1 
Perhaps we should blame it on Brandeis. As is so often the 
case, the perfect turn of phrase often takes on a life of its 
own, rendering more difficult the likelihood of careful and 
balanced analysis of the topic to which the phrase, like a 
barnacle, has become attached. 
 Frederick Schauer2 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal government publishes tens of thousands of 
searchable online databases from hundreds of sources. The site 
Data.gov includes 196,284 unique data setsroughly 150,000 
from the federal government, with the remainder from sub-
 
 1. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE 
IT 92 (Thoemmes Press 2003) (1914). 
 2. Frederick Schauer, The Mixed Blessings of Financial Transparency, 31 
YALE J. REG. 809, 809 (2014). 
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federal and nongovernmental sources.3 Some of these data sets 
include information about private parties that is negative, 
unflattering, or adverse in some way. For example, users can 
search for consumer products that may have caused injuries; 
for drugs that may have caused side effects; for lenders that 
may have treated customers unfairly; for hospitals with higher-
than-average mortality rates; for airlines that lose the most 
luggage; for lobbyists that contribute to federal candidates; or 
for nearby facilities that discharge toxic chemicals. 
Federal agencies often publish these data not just to 
inform the public or promote government transparency, but 
also to pursue “regulatory” aimsto influence the  
underlying behavior being reported. “Regulation by revelation”4 
is not at all new, of course, with a lineage stretching back 
decades.5 By now, disclosure has been so frequently used  
as a tool to discourage certain conduct that it is easy  
to take for granted. Though it is impossible to document all 
regulatory frameworks that rely on disclosure, even a  
partial list shows how ubiquitous it has become. We now  
rely on disclosure to regulate food nutrition,6 fuel  
economy,7 hospital quality,8 mortgages,9 securities,10 sex 
 
 3. Data Catalog, DATA.GOV, https://catalog.data.gov/dataset (last visited July 
16, 2017) [http://perma .cc/6R8L-8VC4] (see “Organization Types” in the left 
sidebar). Data.gov currently includes data from 166 federal agencies and 
subagencies. See Federal Agency Participation, DATA.GOV, http://www.data.gov/ 
metrics (last visited July 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/WTJ6-RJGX]. Note that the 
tally of data sets on Data.gov, including the disappearance of thousands, has been 
tracked closely during the transition to the new Trump administration. See Juliet 




 4. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 126 (2004). 
 5. For one of the first cross-disciplinary writings on regulation via disclosure, 
see William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and 
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999). 
 6. Nutritional Labeling Education Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2010). 
 7. See Download Fuel Economy Data, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/download.shtml (last visited July 16, 2017) 
[http://perma.cc/5B48-BKZE] (providing data back to 1978). 
 8. See discussion infra Section IV.E. 
 9. Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1339, 1341 (2011). 
 10. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure 
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 139 (2006); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information 
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offenders,11 tire safety,12 toxic pollution,13 and workplace 
chemical exposure,14 among many other species of conduct. 
Disclosure has even become a preferred method of regulation 
internationally.15 
Although policymakers have relied on disclosure-based 
regulation for decades,16 it has evolved from peculiarity to 
regularity as the cost of disclosure online decreases and as 
public demand increases. But disclosure also has evolved in 
other important ways. For example, sometimes the real goal of 
disclosure is to persuade rather than inform.17 After all, is the 
Surgeon General’s Warning on tobacco products meant to tell 
consumers something they do not already know? Or is it a 
suggestion not to smoke? Today, disclosure-based regulation is 
much less static (aimed narrowly at helping potential users of 
the information make better decisions) and more dynamic 
(aimed more broadly at trying to influence the disclosers’ 
underlying behavior).18 Frequently, the real party being 
targeted by mandatory disclosure is not the consumer, but the 
discloser,19 under the Brandeisian logic that shining a light on 
undesired behavior will deter it, or at least make it more costly. 
 
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 
(2003). 
 11. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). 
 12. See Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and 
Documentation (TREAD) Act, § 12, 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (2000) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 30170) (requiring manufacturers to disclose rollover risks for new vehicles). In 
2007, Congress required that the information be placed on new car stickers. Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, 
Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 23, and 49 
U.S.C.). 
 13. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 
U.S.C. § 11001 (1986). 
 14. See OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 
(2009) (requiring material safety data sheets in the workplace). 
 15. ARCHONG FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 127–50 (2007); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 
24–25 (2004) (comparing “regulation by information” efforts by the United States 
to those by the European Union and United Nations). 
 16. See, e.g., Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven Salop, The Efficient 
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 491 (1981). 
 17. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 744 (2011). 
 18. Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to 
Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 339 (2013). 
 19. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17. 
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Disclosure, then, remains in bloom. And this bloom is 
reflected in a relatively new species of disclosurethe 
searchable online database. In Part I below, I detail how 
agency databases derive from decades of federal policies 
promoting government transparency, particularly recent 
policies pushing the government to publish more information 
online. Online publication reached a crescendo with the Obama 
administration, which published an Open Government 
Memorandum on the President’s first day in office20 and then 
promoted scores of other transparency projects, including the 
websites FOIA.gov and Data.gov. It is possible, if not likely, 
that data transparency by federal agencies will experience a 
diminuendo under the Trump administration,21 if not a more 
aggressive, weaponized use of disclosure aimed at particular 
parties.22 
Nevertheless, decades of groundwork has enabled not only 
a swell of government data initiatives, but also innovative 
nongovernmental uses of these data. Thousands of government 
data sets beget perhaps thousands more third-party websites, 
mobile applications, and other informational products that rely 
on government data. Perhaps the best example is the federal 
government’s decision in the 1980s to publish Global 
Positioning System (GPS) data for civilian use, which made 
possible the recent wave of applications that incorporate 
geospatial location data,23 such as navigation, restaurant, and 
social media apps. Indeed, when President Obama announced 
his “Open Data Policy,” he remarked that “[t]his kind of 
 
 20. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: 
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 21. For possibilities of reversals in government data policy, see Clare Malone, 
How Trump’s White House Could Mess with Government Data, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Dec. 15, 2016, 6:29 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-trumps-white-
house-could-mess-with-government-data/ [http://perma.cc/TQ6G-2G3Z]. 
 22. For example, when Donald Trump took to Twitter to criticize the contract 
price for Boeing to build a new Air Force One, Boeing stocks immediately dropped. 
See Phillip Bump, Did Donald Trump Tank Boeing’s Stock Because He Was Mad 
about a News Article?, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/06/did-donald-trump-tank-boeings-stock-because-he-
was-mad-about-a-news-article/ [http://perma.cc/L9QM-6KQN]. 
 23. SCOTT PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESSING 
NATIONAL POLICIES, app. B GPS HISTORY, CHRONOLOGY, AND BUDGETS (Rand 
Corp. 1995), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sensing-sensors/readings/GPS_History-MR 
614.appb.pdf [http://perma.cc/E7WZ-A267]; About, HEALTHDATA.GOV, http://www. 
healthdata.gov/content/about (last visited July 16, 2017) [http://perma.cc/B2L7-
LZWV]. 
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innovation and ingenuity has the potential to transform the 
way we do almost everything.”24 Lest readers discount this as 
hyperbole, disclosure policies are often burdened by their 
ambitionsbeing justified as promoting “autonomy, dignity, 
civility, community, citizenship, economic growth, and a 
variety of other virtues.”25 Part II examines these aspirations 
in light of the emerging, somewhat sobering evidence. 
Given the policy justifications, then, many rightly wonder 
who could possibly oppose providing more information to the 
public.26 But as ubiquitous as disclosure has become, criticisms 
have emerged from scholars who doubt that it is “an unalloyed 
good.”27 I consider the burdens of “regulation by database” in 
detail in Part III, including problems with fairness, accuracy, 
and efficacy. But for introductory purposes, Schauer captures 
the skepticism well: 
Secrecy, privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality also have 
their virtues, and we can all understand why transparency 
is a far more desirable attribute for sunroom windows than 
it is for bathroom doors. At times, it seems that 
transparency is a prime example of the old adage that 
where you stand depends on where you sit.28 
But policymakers rarely question whether the burdens of 
disclosure outweigh its purported benefits.29 One goal of this 
 
 24. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President at Applied 
Materials, Inc. - Austin, TX  (May 9, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov 
/photos-and-video/video/2013/05/09/president-obama-speaks-innovation-and-
manufacturing [https://perma.cc/S46L-ZQ63]. 
 25. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 734. 
 26. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at xiii. Similarly, Fenster observes that 
“transparency appears to provide such a remarkable array of benefits that no 
right-thinking politician, administrator, policy wonk, or academic could be against 
it.” Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888–89 
(2006). 
 27. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 1342; Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra 
note 17; Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 
389 (2010); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. 
INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 94 (2012); Karen E.C. Levy & David Merritt Johns, 
When Open Data Is a Trojan Horse: The Weaponization of Transparency in 
Science and Governance, BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1 (Jan.–June 2016), http://journals. 
sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053951715621568 [http://perma.cc/M4HP-VV4C]. 
 28. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1342. 
 29. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 683 (“[L]awmakers rarely 
inquire into the effectiveness or burden of disclosure.”). 
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Article is to help correct this asymmetry with regard to an 
increasingly important species of disclosurethe searchable 
federal database. In Part IV, I evaluate prominent databases 
published by six different agencies: 
Agency Databases Evaluated 
Agency Database Data 
CFPB Consumer Complaint 
Database 
Complaints regarding 
financial product or 
service companies. 
CPSC SaferProducts.gov “Reports of harm” for 
consumer products. 
CMS Hospital Compare,  
Physician Compare, etc. 
Medicare quality of care 
metrics (such as 
mortality rates), with 
corresponding star 
ratings. 
EPA Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI) 
Production and release 
of roughly 650 
dangerous chemicals by 
facility name, address. 
FDA FDA Adverse Event 
Reporting System 
(FAERS), Manufacturer 
and User Facility Device 
Experience (MAUDE) 
Adverse events 
associated with drugs 
(FAERS) and medical 
devices (MAUDE) 
reported to the FDA by 
manufacturers, health 
providers, consumers. 
FEC Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Portal 
Mandatory reports 





Part IV considers which of these databases succeed in 
producing reliable, usable data, and which have been able to 
influence the underlying behavior being tracked. I also consider 
how these databases suffer from different types of flaws, 
including incomplete or inaccurate data, unfriendly user 
interfaces, or databases whose costs of collection, maintenance, 
and presentation likely outweigh their utility. 
Part V offers thoughts on how policymakers can design 
databases for more optimal disclosure, focusing on the inputs 
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and outputs of published data, including procedural safeguards 
to help ensure the quality and reliability of data. The 
recommendations include pre- and post-publication procedures 
for adjudicating “contested” data, evaluating administrative 
law problems that might arise when databases are implicated 
in enforcement actions, offering ideas on how to characterize 
and present the data fairly and accurately, and drawing 
lessons for agencies considering whether to publish “raw” or 
“polished” data, as well as “big” or “small” data. 
Together, these recommendations envision a decidedly 
modern role for the government as a “data steward”30 rather 
than merely as a data source or publisher. For example, there 
are smart ways that the government can help gather and 
generate more datamaking data “bigger.”31 But for some 
information, it might be preferable for the government to distill 
the data and make it more user-friendlymaking data 
“smaller.”32 Either way, federal agencies can help ensure that 
data collection practices are fair, that data that purport to be 
accurate and objective meet those standards, and that the 
sources and any important context or limitations for the data 
are communicated clearly to users. In particular, policymakers 
should resist the notion that more data is always better data. 
Quality matters more than quantity. Part V thus builds on my 
recent work for the Administrative Conference of the United 
States (ACUS), which recently adopted a narrower set of 
recommendations on consumer complaint databases.33 We 
might refer to these recommendations collectively as “Good 
Government Data Practices.” 
As the Article begins, consider the stakes. Successful data 
policies can help ensure healthy markets, empower consumers, 
inform citizens, and even influence the underlying conduct of 
disclosers. Failed data policies, conversely, can produce 
incomplete or “gerrymandered” information, create a false 
 
 30. Kristin Madison, Health Care Decisions in the New Era of Health Care 
Reform: Health Regulators as Data Stewards, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1605, 1607–08 
(2014). 
 31. Id. at 1627–28. 
 32. Id. 
 33. ACUS Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 40,259 (June 21, 
2016); ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., Agency Information Dissemination in 
the Internet Era, https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/agency-information-
dissemin ation-internet-era (last visited July 16, 2017) [http://perma.cc/HP2B-
BWHY] [hereinafter ACUS]. 
 10 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
sense of security, waste resources, undermine public trust, and 
even put lives at risk.34 To design databases for optimal 
disclosure, we must also appreciate that disclosure is an 
exercise of power, that “for one person or institution to have 
information about another is for the former to have power over 
the latter.”35 Similarly, “transparency” can be recharacterized 
as “adverse transparency” if the information is unflattering or 
harmful to the subject in some way.36 How, then, can 
policymakers exercise this power responsibly and fairly? If we 
value disclosure and accept it as a baseline, how do we best 
manage it? As federal data is used more and more to achieve 
regulatory ends, both the means and ends require more 
purposeful policies. 
I. FROM OPEN GOVERNMENT TO OPEN INDUSTRY 
Recent efforts to shine light on the activities of the 
regulated derive from very old efforts to shine light on the 
activities of regulators themselves. For decades, perhaps even 
centuries,37 citizens have pushed the U.S. government to be 
more open and transparent. Indeed, the long arc toward 
government transparency is a defining hallmark of American 
administrative law,38 sitting comfortably “among the pantheon 
of great political virtues.”39 But today’s transparency emerged 
only after decades of reforms, arriving roughly in four waves. 
The 1930s brought efforts to publish so-called “secret laws” 
generated by agencies during the New Deal. The 1940s brought 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s mandates to give regulated 
parties advanced notice of agency actions. The 1960s and 1970s 
 
 34. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 172. 
 35. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1347. 
 36. Sarah Taylor Roller et al., FDA’s Expanding Postmarket Authority to 
Monitor and Publicize Food and Consumer Health Product Risks: The Need for 
Procedural Safeguards to Reduce “Transparency” Policy Harms in the Post-9/11 
Regulatory Environment, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 577, 597 (2009). 
 37. Article I, section 5 of the Constitution requires each chamber of Congress 
to “keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time to publish the same,” 
which some view as a deliberate departure from the secrecy practiced by the 
British Parliament. U.S. CONST. art. I § 5; James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls 
and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1218 
(2010). 
 38. William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative 
LawThree Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (2009). 
 39. Fenster, supra note 26, at 888. 
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introduced FOIA and the era of transparency by request. And 
the 1990s and 2000s introduced mandates for agencies to post 
information on the internet, establishing important agency 
norms of online publication. 
A. Publishing “Secret Laws” 
The New Deal birthed a generation of new executive 
agencies and corresponding regulations. But agencies 
published their regulations at will, if at all.40 One of the 
earliest efforts to address the lack of transparency among 
federal agencies was the Federal Register Act of 1935 (the 1935 
Act),41 which created the now-familiar daily gazette of 
executive documents. Before the 1935 Act, executive branch 
agencies “would each publish their own regulations in various 
separate publications, be they gazettes, bulletins, rulings, 
digests, pamphlets, notices, codes, certificates, orders, and the 
like.”42 
The Act was motivated in part by the famous “hot oil” case, 
Panama Refining.43 The “hot oil” law was part of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, the flagship New Deal bill passed 
during the Great Depression.44 The National Industrial 
Recovery Act authorized President Roosevelt, via the Secretary 
of the Interior, to limit oil production and stabilize prices 
during the discovery of vast new oil fields in Texas.45 During 
litigation over the new authority, “the government was 
embarrassed to admit that a reexamination of the relevant 
documents (which were not publicly available) had revealed 
that the Secretary had inadvertently revoked the relevant 
regulation before the lawsuit had been filed.”46 Just weeks 
before oral argument in the case, Erwin Griswold published a 
 
 40. Rick McKinney, A Research Guide to the Federal Register and the Code of 
Federal Regulations, 46 LAW LIBR. INSIGHTS 10, 10 (2002), http://www.llsdc.org/ 
assets/sourcebook/fall02.pdf [http://perma.cc/5JG4-X54V]. 
 41. 41 U.S.C. § 1501 (1935). 
 42. McKinney, supra note 40, at 10. 
 43. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 44. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
 45. For a brief history on the discovery of new fields in Texas during that 
time, see ROBERT A. CARO, THE PATH TO POWER: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 
612–15 (1981). 
 46. PETER STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
CASES AND COMMENTS 446 (11th ed. 2011). 
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law review article, Government in Ignorance of the Law, 
arguing for a Federal-Register-like system to publish executive 
branch laws.47 The “furor” over the case48 reflected 
longstanding and “widespread dissatisfaction with the 
unsystematic manner in which executive orders, agency 
regulations, and similar materials were being made available 
to the public.”49 As the federal government swelled with new 
agencies and new regulations, frustration reached even high-
level government officials, who found it difficult, if not 
impossible, to locate what became known as “secret laws.”50 
Before 1935, agencies did not even have to publish the 
regulations they imposed.51 
B. The APA and Notice 
Publication requirements were further embedded in 
American law by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 
(APA).52 The APA was a response, in part, to complaints from 
industry that administrative agencies during the New Deal 
 
 47. Erwin N. Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the LawA Plea for 
Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1934). Griswold, 
the future U.S. Solicitor General and Dean of Harvard Law School, most likely 
anticipated the Panama Refining decision. He was an attorney at the Solicitor 
General’s office until 1934 during the briefing of the case. His article was 
published the same month (December 1934) as oral argument in the case. 
STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at 446 n.4. 
 48. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at 446 n.4 (citing Mary Whisner, A 
Manual “to Inform Every Citizen,” 99 LAW LIBR. J. 159, 160 (2007); MORRIS L. 
COHEN, ROBERT C. BERRING, & KENT C. OLSON, HOW TO FIND THE LAW 265 (9th 
ed. 1989)). 
 49. See Cervase v. Office of the Fed. Register, 580 F.2d 1166, 1169 (3d Cir. 
1978) (“The basic object of this statutory reform was to eliminate secret law.”). 
 50. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, THE FEDERAL REGISTER MARCH 14, 1936 – 
MARCH 14, 2006, at  2 (2006), https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/ 
fr_history.pdf [http://perma.cc/A3L5-B6HS]; STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at 
445–46. 
 51. Funk, supra note 38, at 172. Decades later, in 1993, Congress required the 
Government Printing Office (GPO) to make the Federal Register available on the 
Internet. Government Printing Office Information Access Enhancement Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-40, 107 Stat. 112 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 
4101–4104). 
 52. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). States later passed 
their own administrative procedure acts, often modeled on the federal APA, thus 
incorporating the same publication requirements and principles. See MICHAEL A. 
ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3–5 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
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were too opaque and insular, particularly towards the private 
interests most affected by regulation.53 The original APA, in 
section 3, required agencies to publish important materials in 
the Federal Register, and in fact prohibited agencies from 
enforcing rules not published there.54 New APA procedures 
creating “notice and comment” rulemaking have since become a 
hallmark of citizen participation in government.55 Today, the 
APA requires agencies to publish a wide variety of information 
in the Federal Register, including basic information about their 
organizational structure, procedures, and substantive rules.56 
However, many eventually came to view APA section 3 
more as a tool to withhold information than disclose it.57 And 
even between the Federal Register Act and the APA, a 
significant portion of agency documentsguidance, opinions, 
and other important “soft law” adopted by agencieswere not 
available in the Federal Register. Just as before 1935, such 
documents were accessible only on a haphazard basis.58 
Moreover, the APA’s disclosure provisions were largely 
designed to give notice to those whose legal rights were directly 
affected by the agency action, which were “almost invariably 
businesses.”59 Indeed, notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures were premised on the view that regulated parties, 
rather than the public at large, should be given notice and an 
opportunity to comment on proposed rules.60 As Bill Funk 
observes, the APA addressed participation in rulemaking to 
“interested persons,” meaning those with a “direct and palpable 
interest,”61 and required that public records be made available 
to persons “properly and directly concerned,” rather than the 
 
 53. Funk, supra note 38, at 172–73, 178. 
 54. APA § 3, 60 Stat. at 238. 
 55. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) 
Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
79, 85 (2012); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 
EMORY L.J. 433, 517 (2004). 
 56. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012). 
 57. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at 451. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Funk, supra note 38, at 173. 
 60. Id.; ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE 2 (1941). 
 61. Funk, supra note 38, at 174. 
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general public.62 Thus, the APA’s disclosure provisions were 
aimed to inform regulated parties, not shine a light on them, as 
became the focus decades later. 
C. FOIA and Transparency by Request 
If the APA is viewed as a reaction to agency hostility 
towards regulated businesses, then the 1960s and 1970s could 
be viewed as a movement toward recognizing the public 
interest on equal footing.63 The modern open government 
movement really began in 1967, when Congress passed the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),64 requiring agencies to 
index and make public vast amounts of materials not published 
in the Federal Register. Like the APA, FOIA was motivated in 
part by the desire to ensure an informed citizenry.65 President 
Lyndon Johnson, who signed the bill reluctantly and only 
under pressure from the press corps,66 noted that FOIA 
“springs from one of our most essential principles: a democracy 
works best when the people have all the information that the 
security of the nation will permit.”67 Half a century later, 
modern scholars still acknowledge FOIA’s importance to our 
democratic government.68 In requiring the government to make 
its records available upon request unless specifically exempted, 
 
 62. APA, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Funk explains that these goals derive 
in part from the canonical work by James Landis, The Administrative Process. 
Funk, supra note 38, at 177 (citing JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS (1938)). 
 63. Funk, supra note 38, at 178–80. 
 64. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub. L. No 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) 
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996)). The original FOIA was enacted in 1966, 
Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, but was repealed and replaced after Congress 
enacted Title 5 of the U.S. Code into positive law by the 1967 version, which was 
identical in substance. Vladeck has characterized FOIA as “truly an experiment in 
open government.” David C. Vladeck, Information Access – Surveying the Current 
Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1795 
(2008). 
 65. See, e.g., 112 CONG. REC. H13007 (daily ed. June 20, 1966) (statement of 
Rep. Moss). 
 66. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1798. 
 67. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Presidential Statement on Signing the 
Freedom of Information Act (July 4, 1966), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/ 
NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/Document%2031.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6YQ-E7XC]. 
 68. Vladeck, supra note 64 (noting that FOIA “embodies the ideal that 
information is the lifeblood of democracy”). 
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FOIA created a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure.”69 
In fact, it reversed the burden in the original APA that opened 
access to government records only if the requester could 
demonstrate a compelling need.70 
FOIA, of course, has been criticized for falling short of its 
lofty goals of pursuing democracy through transparency and 
accountability.71 A major complaint is that FOIA produces 
transparency only by request.72 It imposes few affirmative 
disclosure obligations on agencies, and relies on a complex 
framework that often requires relatively sophisticated private 
intermediaries with sufficient “time, money, and expertise” to 
“press a recalcitrant administration for disclosure.”73 Scholars 
have also criticized FOIA for being too malleable, particularly 
under administrations that construe its disclosure 
requirements narrowly and exemptions broadly (the George W. 
Bush administration is frequently cited).74 As such, FOIA 
envisions passive disclosure by agencies rather than active 
disclosure or publication of the information they hold.75 
Moreover, the basic premise of FOIA’s “request-and-wait-for-a-
response approach” is seen as obsolete in the Internet era.76 
D. The Internet Era 
In the 1990s, as the internet came of age, a series of laws 
pushed the government to use it. For example, the Paperwork 
 
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(b); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). 
 70. 4 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1964), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(4) (Supp. III 
1964). 
 71. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 88–89 (citing several articles and at least 
one law, the Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our Nation (OPEN) 
Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (codified in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.)). 
 72. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1789. 
 73. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of 
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1020 (2008); Shkabatur, supra note 55, 
at 89; Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1789. 
 74. Scholars often point to the George W. Bush administration on this point. 
President Bush instructed federal agencies to deny FOIA requests when they 
could invoke a “sound legal basis.” Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y 
Gen., to the Heads of All Fed. Dep’ts & Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001); Vladeck, supra 
note 64, at 1790; Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 89. 
 75. Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the 
Internet Era, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1371, 1438–39 (2011). 
 76. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1792–93. 
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Reduction Act of 1995,77 the Electronic Freedom of Information 
Act of 1996 (sometimes called “E-FOIA”),78 and the 
Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 199879 directed 
federal agencies to use the internet to publish more 
information online and to “improve the productivity, efficiency, 
and effectiveness of Federal programs.”80 In particular, E-FOIA 
required agencies to publish online their final opinions and 
orders, as well as records likely to be requested,81 thus 
spawning the surge in agency online “reading rooms.”82 
During this time, regulators began to rely more on 
mandatory reporting to inform agency actions, including both 
rulemaking and enforcement. Somewhat quickly, internet 
technologies reduced the costs of gathering and disseminating 
such information online, which increased both public demand 
and expectations for agency records. Thus, federal agencies 
began to publish copious amounts of information not just about 
their own activities, but about regulated parties as well.83 
In the 2000s, as federal agencies built sprawling 
websites,84 a new generation of laws pushed for even more 
online disclosure. For example, the E-Government Act of 2002 
required federal agencies to post more information online and 
make it more accessible through improved organization.85 The 
Act also created the Office of Electronic Government within the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), headed by a Chief 
Information Officer that would coordinate with agencies 
through a Council.86  As with prior laws, the stated goal of the 
E-Government Act was to encourage the federal government to 
enhance public access to information and government services, 
 
 77. Pub. L. No. 104-13, § 2, 109 Stat. 163, 167 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 
3504(h)(5)). 
 78. Pub. L. No. 101-231, 110 Stat. 347 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552). 
 79. Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. XVII, § 1702, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 44 
U.S.C. § 3504). 
 80. Pub. L. No. 104-13, § 2, 109 Stat. 163, 167 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 
3504(h)(5)). 
 81. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D). 
 82. Presidential Statement on Signing the Electronic Freedom of Information 
Act Amendments of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1949 (Oct. 2, 1996). 
 83. James O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites: Exploring Remedies for 
Federal Internet Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (2003). 
 84. Id.; Cortez, supra note 75, at 1393. 
 85. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 86. Id. 
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this time using internet technologies.87 In 2007, the Open 
Government Act addressed various frustrations with FOIA, 
requiring new agency procedures and new public liaison offices 
designed to address persistent agency delays in responding to 
FOIA requests.88 
Likewise, during the 2000s, Congress also passed laws 
requiring more transparency in federal spending, directing the 
OMB to publish online the details of federal grants, loans, and 
contracts.89 Today, the public can search the federal website 
USAspending.gov to view entities that have received federal 
money,90 or more narrowly focused sites like Recovery.gov to 
see how the federal government has spent money from the 
economic stimulus package of 2009.91 The former includes a 
searchable database with the name and location of the entity 
receiving federal money, the amount received, the type of 
transaction, the funding body, the purpose of the funding, and 
other information.92 As Vladeck notes, the site “was able to 
piggyback on the work of OMB Watch, a nonprofit watchdog 
organization that with foundation support had already 
constructed a comprehensive, searchable database that is also 
 
 87. Id. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 2902 (defining “electronic government”). 
 88. Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552). 
 89. E-Government Act of 2002; Federal Funding Accountability and 
Transparency Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-282, 120 Stat. 1186 (codified at 31 
U.S.C. § 6101). 
 90. See USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov (last visited Aug. 3, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/2LDE-WR48]. 
 91. U.S. RECOVERY ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANS. BD., http://www.recovery. 
gov. The site and its data were removed after the Recovery Accountability and 
Transparency Board declined to renew a license with Dun & Bradstreet, a firm 
that assigned identification numbers for all entities doing business with the U.S. 
Government. See Christian Davenport, Data on $800 Billion in Stimulus 
Spending Will Disappear This Year. Here is Why., WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/data-on-800-billion-in-
stimulus-spending-will-disappear-this-year-here-is-why/2014/09/09/ad277ff4-350a 
-11e4-8f02-03c644b2d7d0_story.html [https://perma.cc/V62M-ZMM5]. In 2012, the 
U.S. House passed a bill that would publish even more online data about federal 
spending, and would have created a Federal Accountability and Spending 
Transparency Commission to implement the new provisions. See Digital 
Accountability and Transparency (DATA) Act, H.R. 2146, 112th Cong. (2012). The 
bill died in the Senate. See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Bill Summary & Status, 
112th Congress (2011-12), H.R. 2146, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z? 
d112:h.r.02146 (last visited July 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ N256-82W7]. 
 92. Pub. L. No. 109-282, § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat.1187; see also USASPENDING.GOV, 
supra note 90. 
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available free of charge to the public.”93 This work reflects a 
marked shift from focusing on information about the 
government to information about private parties. 
In 2001, Congress passed an important but less frequently 
discussed law, the Information Quality Act (IQA), sometimes 
referred to as the Data Quality Act (DQA).94 The Act required 
the OMB to issue government-wide guidelines for “ensuring 
and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of 
information . . . disseminated by the government.”95 It also 
required the OMB to “establish administrative mechanisms 
allowing affected persons to seek and obtain correction of 
information maintained and disseminated by the agency” that 
does not meet those standards.96 In 2002, the OMB finalized 
guidelines implementing the Act,97 followed by agencies issuing 
their own guidelines.98 
These IQA guidelines would seem well suited to regulate 
the quality of information posted in agency databases. Yet the 
Act’s application to databases is highly unclear, and probably 
varies by database. The broad wording of the IQA states that 
the OMB guidelines should apply to agency “dissemination of 
public information, regardless of the form or format.”99 And the 
OMB guidelines define “information” as “any communication or 
representation of knowledge such as facts or data, in any 
 
 93. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1829–30 (citing About, FEDSPENDING.ORG, 
http://www.fedspending.org/aboutthissite.php (last visited August 1, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/QPC2-7ZT5]). Note that OMB Watch later changed its name to 
the Center for Effective Government, but ended operations in March 2016, 
transferring most of its resources to the Project on Government Oversight 
(POGO). See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, http://www.foreffectivegov.org (last 
visited June 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7GF7-LGSD]. 
 94. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001); 44 U.S.C. § 
3516 (2012). 
 95. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
2001 § 515. The Information Quality Act built on earlier requirements in the 
Paperwork Reduction Act that addressed information dissemination. See 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163, 168. 
 96. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
2001 § 515. 
 97. 66 Fed. Reg. 34,489 (June 28, 2001) (proposed guidelines); 66 Fed. Reg. 
49,718 (Sept. 28, 2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 369 (Jan. 3, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 
22, 2002). 
 98. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Agency Information Quality Guidelines, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/inforeg_agency_info_quality_links/ 
(last visited July 15, 2015) [https://perma.cc/8YZZ-PKRF]. 
 99. 44 U.S.C. § 3504(d)(1). 
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medium or form,”100 including “information that an agency 
disseminates from a web page.”101 However, the OMB excludes 
from coverage “opinions, where the agency’s presentation 
makes it clear that what is being offered is someone’s opinion 
rather than fact or the agency’s views.”102 The guidelines also 
exempt “adjudicative processes.”103 These exemptions might 
thus exclude important agency databases, such as the CFPB’s 
Consumer Complaint Database.104  
All this is prelude, however, to the Obama administration 
and its efforts toward open government. On his first full day in 
office, President Obama published the Open Government 
Memorandum,105 as well as a memorandum on FOIA.106 
Although various internet-driven transparency initiatives 
emerged during the Clinton and Bush administrations, the two 
Obama documents were viewed as a gesture toward openness 
and a turn from the secrecy that characterized the Bush 
administration.107 
In December 2009, the OMB published the Open 
Government Directive,108 following on President Obama’s Open 
Government Memorandum, urging agencies to “take prompt 
steps to expand access to information by making it available 
online in open formats.”109 The directive required each agency, 
within 45 days, to “identify and publish online in an open 
format at least three high-value data sets . . . on Data.gov” that 
 
 100. 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8458–59. 
 101. Id. at 8460. 
 102. 67 Fed. Reg. 369, 377. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
 105. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: 
Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 
2009). As Shkabatur notes, “[d]ozens of other countries” have followed this 
example. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 80 (citing OPEN GOVERNMENT 
PARTNERSHIP, http://www.opengovpartnership.org (last visited July 15, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/R85P-AWL5]). 
 106. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: 
Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 107. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 46, at 441. Of course, even the Obama 
administration has been criticized for rejecting more transparency in matters of 
terrorism and national security. Jeff Kahn, Terrorist Watchlists, in CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017). 
 108. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to 
the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file with author). 
 109. Id. at 2. 
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had previously not been available.110 Within sixty days, each 
agency was to create an Open Government web page. Today, 
eighty different federal agencies and subagencies have posted 
196,284 datasets on Data.gov.111 
In 2011, the Justice Department created FOIA.gov, a 
website that publicizes data on how agencies have performed 
their FOIA duties.112 The searchable online database displays 
the number of FOIA requests received by each agency, the 
disposition of those requests, and the current backlog. 
Ironically, like other mandatory disclosure regimes, the Justice 
Department is using “naming and shaming” to encourage 
agencies to be more responsive to FOIA requests.113 Still, 
scholars question how effectively “naming and shaming” is at 
convincing under-performing agencies to increase their 
responsiveness to FOIA requests.114 
As this history shows, federal transparency efforts 
gradually evolved from general right-to-know laws like FOIA, 
aimed at increasing transparency in the government itself, to 
disclosure of information held by the government regarding the 
activities of corporations and regulated entities.115 Thus, the 
current gestalt that pursues transparency from industry owes 
much to earlier right-to-know efforts that pursued 
transparency from government.116 Moreover, as with so many 
other things, information technology has enabled the use of 
databases and disclosure as a regulatory tool. Internet 
technologies are being used to mine the data of countless 
industries and activities, post them in the public domain, and 
make them accessible through searching, sorting, and other 
data-sifting tools. 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Federal Agency Participation, supra note 3. 
 112. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, What is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/AQ6A-PE9Q ]. 
 113. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 100. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See also FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at xii–xiii. They call this “targeted 
transparency.” Id. 
 116. Id. at 28. Of course, one could support more transparency from 
government without supporting more transparency from industry, and vice versa. 
But the two trends seem to be part of the same historical arc towards more public 
reporting and openness by regulatory agencies. 
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II. DATA AND ITS ASPIRATIONS 
Agency databases have become ubiquitous in part because 
they appeal to so many of our intuitions about how 
government, markets, and regulation should work. So much so, 
in fact, that disclosure skeptics criticize the optimists for too 
often posing it as a panaceaa Swiss Army policy “intended to 
promote autonomy, dignity, civility, community, citizenship, 
economic growth, and a variety of other virtues.”117 
Contemporary scholarship, of course, has focused on the many 
ways in which internet technologies have facilitated 
communication between the government and the public.118 But 
after years of scholarly praise of the internet’s role in 
facilitating transparency, accountability, and democracy, 
inevitable critiques have emerged.119 Still, disclosure 
frequently is offered as a tool that can achieve market, 
regulatory, and democratic ideals.120 
A. Market Ideals 
A frequently invoked rationale for regulatory disclosures is 
that disclosure can improve consumer decision-making, 
facilitate markets, and “protect the naïve from the 
sophisticated.”121 Various disclosure regimes, at their heart, try 
to resolve the famous “lemons problem” framed by George 
Akerloff, who argued that in markets with information 
asymmetries between buyers and sellers, sellers may have an 
incentive to sell inferior products or services, which can 
 
 117. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 734. 
 118. For just a small sample, see, e.g., BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER 
(W. Lance Bennett & Robert M. Entman eds., 2003); STEPHEN COLEMAN & JAY G. 
BLUMLER, THE INTERNET AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: THEORY, PRACTICE AND 
POLICY (2009). 
 119. See, e.g., MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2003); 
EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM 
(2011). 
 120. Indeed, Sage evaluated these types of justifications almost twenty years 
ago, characterizing them somewhat differently as four separate rationales 
(competition, agency, performance, and democratic). See Sage, supra note 5, at 
1710–11. He also observes, however, that disclosure rationales can often be 
contradictory or at least in tension.  Id. 
 121. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 649. 
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undermine the market.122 By requiring disclosure, the 
government can correct these asymmetries and facilitate 
efficient markets. Schauer calls this “transparency as 
efficiency”the idea that freely available information “is 
precisely what makes markets operate effectively.”123 
At their best, agency databases can inspire a “race to the 
top” by encouraging firms to compete based on their published 
activities. One of the original aspirations for the CFPB’s 
Consumer Complaint Database was to encourage companies to 
use the data to publicize how well they respond to consumer 
complaints compared to competitors.124 The Bureau points to 
this phenomenon in the airline industry, where airlines use 
data by the Department of Transportation and FAA to market 
their low rates of passenger complaints compared to 
competitors, and where third party airline ratings systems 
make use of the same government data.125 The Bureau 
concludes that after the data is made public, “The marketplace 
of ideas then does the rest.”126 
Disclosure thus satisfies both our free-market intuitions127 
and the policymaker’s urge to do something. In the law that 
created the CFPB, Congress repeatedly asserted that the 
Bureau would publish information that helped consumers 
make more informed choices about financial products and 
services128a refrain repeated frequently by the Bureau in its 
 
 122. George A. Akerloff, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing the used car market as 
an example). 
 123. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1350. 
 124. Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,628, 
76,630 n.9 (Dec. 8, 2011). 
 125. Id. at 76,631. 
 126. Id. Of course, airlines now face a new form of naming and shaming from 
customers themselves, who can record and publish examples of poor customer 
service. See, e.g., Avi Selk, A Man Wouldn’t Leave an Overbooked United Flight. 




 127. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 681. 
 128. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1021, 124 Stat. 1979 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C.§§ 5511(b)(1), (5)) 
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information to make responsible decisions about financial transactions” and help 
the market “operate transparently and efficiently”). 
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own publications.129 Consumer advocates, in fact, have 
encouraged the Bureau’s database efforts by arguing that 
“disclosure is one of the best tools government agencies can 
use.”130 
A related consumer-centered ideal served by disclosure is 
autonomy. As Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue, mandated 
disclosure is alluring because “[i]t supposes that people make 
better decisions for themselves than anyone can make for them 
and that people are entitled to freedom in making decisions.”131 
Countless mandatory disclosure laws rely on this logic.132 The 
CFPB’s complaint data, the CPSC’s product safety data, and 
many other data sets are predicated on consumers using the 
data to vote with their wallets, avoiding substandard 
performers.133 
Finally, corporations and industry groups often “urge 
greater transparency as an alternative to allegedly more 
heavy-handed regulation.”134 Of course, many scholars embrace 
this view as well.135 As Archon Fung and colleagues emphasize, 
the “ingeniousness” of regulation via disclosure “lies in its 
mobilization of individual choice, market forces, and 
participatory democracy through relatively light-handed 
government action.”136 Regulation by disclosure thus appeals 
across both political and ideological spectra. 
B. Regulatory Ideals 
A second aspiration of disclosure is to achieve regulatory 
endsusing publication to preempt or at least deter undesired 
behavior. Corporate and securities law, for example, rely 
heavily on disclosure of company holdings and transactions, 
with the idea that corporations whose dealings are transparent 
 
 129. See, e.g., Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 78 Fed. Reg. 21,218, 
21,225 (Apr. 10, 2013). 
 130. Id. at 21,220. 
 131. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 17, at 681. 
 132. Id. (citing examples from the FTC and others). 
 133. See discussion infra Sections IV.C and IV.D. 
 134. Schauer, supra note 9, at 1341 (citing L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion, 
Transparency is More Powerful Than Regulation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2009, at 
A21; Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, Disclosure is the Best Kind 
of Credit Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2008, at A17). 
 135. See, e.g., Crovitz, supra note 134; Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 134. 
 136. FUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 5. 
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and publicly accessible will think twice before acting in ways 
that harm investors.137 Similarly, requiring hospitals to 
publish mortality rates is really a device to encourage hospitals 
to reduce mortality rates.138 Again, the same logic motivates 
many disclosure regimes, with a long lineage. In 1796, Jeremy 
Bentham observed that “the more strictly we are watched, the 
better we behave.”139 
Agencies also frequently use databases to publish 
compliance and enforcement data.140 Scholars have called for 
agencies to actively publish enforcement records that are 
available under FOIA but must be requested.141 For example, 
David Vladeck argues that Congress should require the OMB 
to compile enforcement records in a searchable database to 
“permit the public to track repeat-offender corporations in the 
same way the public can now track grants and contracts given 
to the same corporate recipients.”142 For years, a nonprofit 
based at Syracuse University, called the Transactional Records 
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), has published enforcement data 
gathered via FOIA from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (ATF), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).143 
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Enforcement data may also help counter 
underenforcement by agencies, what Matthew Stephenson calls 
“agency slack.”144 Scholars note widespread underenforcement 
by a variety of agencies in a variety of contexts.145 Even when 
agencies do pursue regulatory violations, they often fail to 
enforce them.146 Underenforcement may derive from several 
sourcesinsufficient agency resources, ideology, anti-
regulatory pressures, political oversight, inertia, or agency self-
interest.147 Regardless of the contributors, making compliance 
and enforcement data public might inspire agencies to reach 
more optimal levels of enforcementor even inspire companies 
to reach more optimal levels of compliance. Observers also 
suspect the converse. When the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) “abruptly removed inspection reports, warning letters, 
and other documents on nearly 8000 animal facilities that the 
agency regulates” from its website in February 2017, critics 
worried that the move would shield violators from journalists 
and animal rights groups.148 
If publication alone does not encourage compliance, 
perhaps use of the data by third-party intermediaries can. In 
justifying its Consumer Complaint Database, the CFPB 
pointed to companies offering commercial intelligence products 
based on data from the FDA’s drug and device adverse events 
databases (FAERS and MAUDE).149 The CFPB itself notes that 
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& POL’Y REV. 453, 473–74 (2011). 
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356 SCIENCE 790, 790 (2017). 
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J.: HEALTH J. (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020 
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third-party users, like the consulting firm Deloitte and the U.S. 
News & World Report, are relying on the Bureau’s data to 
publish findings and recommendations.150 Moreover, there is 
always the lingering fear that shareholders, plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
media, bloggers, or other enforcement agencies will use 
published data against companies. 
An emerging potential use of government data, and one 
encouraged by the government itself, is “crowdsourcing.” 
Crowdsourcing is a method of soliciting answers, ideas, 
resources, or services from a large network of people, typically 
online.151 Technologists have envisioned the government 
serving as a “platform” for innovation by providing data that 
inspires outside parties to create innovative uses for the 
data.152 Government agencies cannot predict how their data 
sets might be used by the public, but the act of publishing data 
in raw, open, and machine-readable format allows the public to 
generate innovative and perhaps more enlightening uses of the 
data.153 
The Obama administration pursued several crowdsourcing 
initiatives, published on websites like Challenge.gov, which 
features various prize competitions sponsored by over eighty 
federal agencies.154 The site claims that the government has 
awarded “[m]ore than $250 million in prize money” since 
2010.155 The idea is that “U.S. federal agencies invite the 
public’s help to solve perplexing mission-centric problems.”156 
Indeed, even the administration’s original Open Government 
Directive offered contests and prizes that incentivized the 
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public to “tinker” with the data released.157 Thus, some of the 
most provocative uses of agency data may just be emerging. 
C. Democratic Ideals 
A third and more lofty justification for publishing 
government data is to enhance government accountability.158  
Transparency is often assumed to be its precondition.159 
Leading thinkerssuch as John Milton, John Stuart Mill, 
James Madison, Oliver Wendell Holmes (father of the 
marketplace of ideas),160 and Louis Brandeishave long drawn 
an explicit link between transparency, accountability, and 
democracy.161 Centuries of writing are filled with paeans to the 
virtues of transparency. Today, the modern open source 
movement, which owes much to these forebears and helped 
seed the open government movement, holds that information is 
a necessary precondition for truth and progress.162 Seen in this 
way, agency databases are a logical vehicle for both 
technological and democratic progress. 
 
 157. Exec. Office of the President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, Ser. No. M-10-11 (2010); Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 
111 n.173. 
 158. Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 80; Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, 
Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
909, 917 (2006). 
 159. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: 
Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 
(Jan. 21, 2009); Fenster, supra note 26, at 894–99; Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 
83. 
 160. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 161. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“A popular 
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a 
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.” As FUNG ET AL., supra note 
15, at 24, discuss, this language is carved on the Library of Congress building); 
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the 
power of [an assertion] to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market . . . .”); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 
1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–3 (1984). 
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Government databases can also serve an expressive 
function by acting as a conduit for consumers to air their 
grievances.163 Presidents Kennedy and Nixon both 
promulgated a Consumer Bill of Rights to pose the government 
as an intermediary or a tribunal through which consumer 
complaints could be given a voice.164 Such a role can increase 
the public’s confidence in government, providing “a positive 
point of contact” between agencies and citizens, and promoting 
the idea of “government as a positive force in society.”165 The 
CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database essentially serves this 
role today. 
In short, there are compelling reasons why data disclosure 
appeals to policymakers so much. Disclosure seems consistent 
with free-market and autonomy principles, and seems to be an 
easy and effective intervention compared to more traditional 
regulation.166 Politically, regulation by disclosure is cast as a 
“path of least resistance for administrative agencies seeking to 
promote meaningful change.”167 Indeed, calls for disclosure and 
transparency are often justified, on a more fundamental plane, 
as furthering the pursuit of truth, knowledge, and societal 
progress.168 
III. DATA AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
But does disclosure live up to its many promises? In this 
Part, I consider the shortcomings of database disclosures, 
before evaluating several prominent agency databases in Part 
IV. Part V then considers ways to design databases for more 
optimal, effective disclosure. 
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First and foremost, agency disclosure of information about 
regulated parties can itself cause a variety of harms, ranging 
from concrete (a devaluation of stock price) to less tangible, 
reputational harms.169 Although scholarship on these harms is 
not voluminous, the harms are relatively well documented.170 
For example, in 2008 the FDA and CDC mistakenly identified 
tomatoes as the source of a salmonella outbreak, costing the 
tomato industry an estimated $200 million in lost sales.171 And 
there are numerous instances in which a company’s stock value 
plummeted after an agency announcement criticized the 
company.172 As Vladeck notes, “[t]here is also force, as a 
general matter, to the argument that companies should not be 
subject to commercial harm simply because they are compelled 
to report their activities to the government.”173 
Questions about the value of so-called “naming and 
shaming” have crept into various disciplines.174 In the book Is 
Shame Necessary?, Jennifer Jacquet considers the virtues and 
flaws of modern naming and shaming, particularly how social 
media and other modern modes of communication might 
amplify shame effectively to change the behavior of 
corporations or even governments.175 Indeed, organizations like 
Wikileaks derive tremendous power and influence from 
disclosurethe kind of nongovernmental power normally 
reserved for mainstream media.176 
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Less sanguine views argue that “shaming is the very 
antithesis of the law,”177 particularly when wielded by the 
government. For example, Donald Trump’s Twitter posts, the 
focus of significant handwringing, demonstrate the unfair 
destructive power of adverse publicity. In December 2016, 
Boeing stock took a quick plunge after President-elect Trump 
took to Twitter to criticize the cost of Boeing’s contract to build 
a new Air Force One.178 After the episode, some investors and 
market analysts began to monitor Trump’s tweets for potential 
market-moving proclamations.179 
A second objection to the use of disclosure as a regulatory 
tool is that it may be ineffective. There is growing scholarly 
skepticism that openness necessarily leads to knowledge or 
that more information necessarily produces better decisions.180 
As David Vladeck observes, “there is now a significant and 
growing dissonance between the promises made by our federal 
right-to-know laws and their performance.”181 And as Ben-
Shahar and Schneider emphasize in their magisterial article, 
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, disclosure regimes often 
fail completely in meeting their goals, and in fact can have 
unintended consequences that hinder them.182 Although their 
bearish views are challenged,183 the virtues of disclosure no 
longer remain uncontested. 
A third objection to agency disclosure in general, and to 
databases in particular, is that they are not always complete or 
accurate. To be most useful, data that purport to present 
truthful, objective information must meet those standards. 
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Otherwise, they risk succumbing to a problem known well to 
computer and software engineers: “Garbage in, garbage out.”184 
Flawed inputs produce flawed outputs, and inaccurate 
databases will be unreliable. Even well-known advocates of 
regulation by information, such as Cass Sunstein, acknowledge 
the dangers of regulating based on flawed data.185 Litigation 
challenging inaccurate reports on the CPSC’s 
SaferProducts.gov database demonstrates that agencies 
sometimes post inaccurate data, and sometimes that data 
lingers online for years before it is corrected or retracted.186 
The FEC’s campaign finance data is widely acknowledged to be 
incomplete.187 The FDA’s medical device database, which 
tracks problems with devices and is subject to mandatory 
reporting requirements, is undermined dramatically by under-
reporting.188 Even relatively noncontroversial databases like 
USAspending.gov and Recovery.gov have been found to have 
widespread inaccuracies.189 Both the OMB and GAO have 
acknowledged that data on the sites has been inaccurate, 
untimely, or incomplete.190 An independent review by the 
Sunlight Foundation found that the sites had “over 1.2 trillion 
dollars’ worth of misreported spending in 2009 alone.”191 
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Inaccurate or incomplete data sets can be even more 
problematic if agencies process them with software algorithms 
or artificial intelligence to identify regulatory violators or 
single out firms for further investigation.192 The use of such 
algorithms for regulatory enforcement purposes raises a host of 
novel questions about agency delegations, justifications, and 
reasoning.193 Moreover, increased skepticism of the accuracy 
and objectivity of algorithmic decision making warrants further 
investigation, particularly as regulators rely on these methods 
more.194 
A related criticism of agency databases is that they often 
present data without appropriate context.195 Jennifer 
Shkabatur notes that it is hard for a lay person browsing 
USASpending.gov, for example, to evaluate whether a $20 
million contract between the Department of Commerce and 
Industrial Economics for “continued support for the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill” is money well-spent, or whether an $817 
million contract between the Department of Defense and 
Lockheed Martin for “incremental funding” is wasteful.196 But 
that is the only information provided. Thus, she argues, “even 
if data is timely and reliable,” when stripped of context, it may 
not always be particularly meaningful or useful.197  Providing 
appropriate context is one way for agencies to act as data 
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“stewards,” rather than to serve as mere publishers or 
repositories. 
Scholars also note that agencies exercise significant 
discretion to decide what data to disclose and the scope of that 
data, which can skew user perceptions.198 Industry repeatedly 
made such arguments as the CFPB built its Consumer 
Complaint Database. Commenters objected that the database 
would necessarily include only self-selected complaints that 
were nonrandom and thus not representative of the consumer 
population.199 Industry commenters also objected that the 
complaints lacked context and that users might overlook the 
data’s limitations, despite disclaimers by the Bureau.200 
Another problem with agency disclosure is the volume of it, 
ironically, and the risk of drowning the public with 
information. Data.gov currently hosts over 195,000 data 
sets,201 some of which include millions of records or data points. 
But more information is not always better 
informationalthough many disclosure regimes assume 
otherwise.202 Today, federal agencies post so much information 
online that many scholars wonder who is served by these data 
dumps.203 The conventional wisdom is that few benefit from an 
“undifferentiated mass of information” posted online, as the 
“cost of sifting through it would overwhelm its value.”204 
Genuinely useful information is often buried.205 As Paredes 
notes, sunlight can be the best disinfectant, “[b]ut sunlight can 
also be blinding.”206 
So how does salient information stand out? Evaluations of 
mandatory disclosures regimes find that even the most well-
known are ignored: “Next to the warning label on cigarette 
packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored piece of official 
advice in our society.”207 Gradually, because mandated 
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disclosures are so attractive to policymakers, they tend to 
accumulate over time, which only compounds the 
problem“disclosures are added, never removed.”208 As Ben-
Shahar and Schneider observe, consumers “encounter too many 
disclosures to digest most of them.”209 Such concerns lend 
credence to the idea that sophisticated intermediaries will 
continue to serve a valuable channeling and interpretive role. 
Indeed, the idea behind the massive data dumps on Data.gov 
and other federal databases “is that nongovernmental 
intermediaries can step in and translate the raw data for the 
general public.”210 
A related shortcoming of disclosure is the complexity of the 
data. Mandated disclosure regimes have become ubiquitous in 
federal and state law, ensconced in statutes, ordinances, 
agency regulations, and common law.211 Sometimes, these 
sources of law demand “marvelously elaborate disclosures” that 
are difficult if not impossible for the intended beneficiaries 
(usually consumers) to understand.212 Consumers, of course, 
are not perfectly rational, but exercise “bounded rationality” 
due to various cognitive biases and distortions.213 Thus, many 
scholars have come to recognize that disclosure of objective 
information may not, in itself, generate optimal 
outcomesrather, disclosure regimes “may need to aggregate, 
translate, simplify, or benchmark the facts.”214 Even if users do 
not understand the science or statistical techniques behind the 
data, the data may still be successful in improving the product 
or conduct targeted by the disclosure.215 
Given the volume and complexity of most data, intended 
beneficiaries often do not and cannot use it, particularly in the 
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idealized way policymakers intend. In a variety of legal 
contexts, the targets for information disclosure “often do not 
read disclosed information, do not understand it when they 
read it, and do not use it even if they understand it.”216 
Examples abound. A troubling one is the extensive campus 
crime data reported by colleges and universities to the 
Department of Education under the Clery Act,217 which often 
goes unread.218 Nevertheless, the Department promises that 
the Clery Act “is intended to provide students and their 
families, as higher education consumers, with accurate, 
complete, and timely information about safety on campus so 
that they can make informed decisions.”219 The current reality 
is that, for most databases, such aspirations outstrip reality. 
Databases and other disclosure regimes can also be costly. 
Disclosure is often assumed to be simple and low-cost, 
particularly compared to more conventional regulation and 
enforcement.220 But successful disclosure systems often require 
“a distinctive and demanding architecture.”221 Any thoughtful 
disclosure regime must determine what information must be 
disclosed, by whom, to whom, the optimal format, and 
appropriate quality assurance and enforcement mechanisms.222 
Indeed, many assume that disclosure avoids many of the 
compliance and enforcement costs that attend to traditional 
command-and-control regulation.223 But, compliance with 
disclosure regimes must also be monitored and 
enforcedfrequently with both civil and criminal penalties.224 
For regimes with low rates of compliance, policymakers have 
often increased both penalties and enforcement efforts.225 
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Moreover, the cost to disclosers can be significant. For 
example, a single new SEC requirement that companies file 
“current reports” of insider transactions was expected to 
generate 215,000 additional filings to the SEC annually, at an 
estimated cost of over $89 million per year.226 Another recent 
study found that U.S. physicians in just four common 
specialties spend $15.4 billion annually reporting under 
various quality measurement programs.227 Thus, regulation by 
disclosure can be costly. 
Opportunity costs can also be significant. Relying on 
disclosure as a means to pursue regulatory ends may mean 
bypassing other, better means for achieving those ends.228 
Traditional command-and-control regulation long ago lost its 
luster among policymakers and academics.229 But modern 
replacements like “new governance,” despite their many 
promises, can underwhelm. Despite the widespread use of 
disclosure, “it remains an open question whether transparency 
as regulation is better or worse, all things considered, than 
more direct forms of regulation.”230 One might reasonably 
wonder whether the time and personnel that agencies spend on 
disclosure would be better spent writing regulations and 
enforcing them. 
Finally, there is some evidence that mandatory disclosure 
regimes can backfire. Consumers might be tempted to let their 
guards down when presented with mandated disclosures that 
give transactions a “veneer of legality.”231 There is also 
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evidence that the party required to disclose information often 
interprets their compliance with the disclosure requirement as 
granting them license to act more harshly.232 Although there is 
much more research to be done, again, the virtues of disclosure 
are no longer uncontested. 
IV. AGENCY DATABASES 
Nascent skepticism with the use of disclosure as a 
regulatory tool has not stopped disclosure efforts from 
proliferating. Today, thousands of federal agency websites host 
hundreds of thousands of agency databases (as of February 
2017, over 195,000).233 As such, writing about government data 
is difficult because databases have become so very common.234 
A comprehensive survey of agency databases would “pointlessly 
burden” the audience, risking the same information overload 
often imposed by policymakers that rely on disclosure.235 
Nevertheless, as becomes quickly obvious,236 agency databases 
are becoming the norm rather than the exception. 
Below I survey six of the most salient agency efforts to post 
searchable data sets online. Of course, there are many more 
worth discussiontoo many for a single article. The following 
represents a cross-section of databases that try to achieve 
regulatory goals, using online disclosure of behavior to try to 
affect that behavior. 
A. The FEC’s Campaign Finance Data 
For decades, federal campaign finance law has relied on 
disclosure not only to police limits on campaign contributions 
and spending, but also to pursue deeper goals of deterring 
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corruption and the appearance of it.237 Indeed, disclosure has 
been, perhaps, the one leg of the campaign finance law tripod 
to be spared by the Supreme Court.238 Unlike limits on 
campaign contributions and expenditures, disclosure 
requirements have endured repeated First Amendment 
challengesfrom early cases like Burroughs239 to more strident 
recent cases like Citizens United and McCutcheon.240 Of course, 
in the seminal case Buckley v. Valeo,241 the Court upheld 
various disclosure requirements introduced in the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and the FECA 
Amendments of 1974.242 In the ensuing decades, as courts 
invalidated various restrictions on campaign contributions and 
expenditures on First Amendment grounds, disclosure 
requirements endured. Thus, through attrition, disclosure has 
become the preferred choice for regulating money in politics.243 
Indeed, recent reform proposals would address lingering 
problems with campaign finance regulation by using even more 
disclosures, for example, by trying to triangulate FEC data 
with data from other agencies like the SEC and IRS.244 
Today, the FEC maintains several searchable online 
databases on its website, which are centralized on the FEC’s 
Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal.245 Users can search FEC 
data based on reports required of federal candidates, parties, 
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committees, donors, and lobbyists, among others.246 The data 
are generally searchable by name, date, and location,247 and 
are presented in list, map, and chart form,248 making them 
more accessible to lay users. Thus, for example, a user can 
learn how much money a federal candidate in her district has 
raised and spent, or how much a certain political action 
committee (PAC) has dedicated to electioneering, or find 
detailed information about independent expenditures or 
bundled contributions.249 The FEC’s Disclosure Data Catalog 
publishes these datasets in downloadable .CSV, .XML, or .XSD 
formats,250 thus making them more useful for sophisticated 
users. 
Despite their broad scope, FEC databases pay special 
attention, of course, to the activities of candidates and 
committees. Users can search for federal candidates and 
political committees by name and view on a single page all 
reports filed by that person or committee, including a multi-
year summary of the money they raised and spent.251 
Like many other agencies, the FEC also publishes online 
searchable databases of enforcement records. Its Enforcement 
Query System is a searchable depository of FEC enforcement 
documents, including complaints, responses, settlements, and 
other relevant documents.252 The system includes, for example, 
a searchable and sortable list of parties required to pay 
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administrative fines for violating reporting requirements.253 
Users can view the name of the party fined, the type of report 
filed late (or not at all), the amount of the fine, and any related 
candidate information.254 
Congress has recognized that data held by the FEC can be 
more meaningful when combined with data held by other 
institutions, including Congress itself. For example, the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 requires “lobbyists” to register 
with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate 
and disclose their lobbying activities, including who they 
lobbied and on what issues, bills, or other government 
action.255 The Act requires House and Senate officials to use 
“computerized systems” with “coding” and “cross-indexing” to 
“maximize public access to materials filed.”256 Congress also 
requires these reports to be available over the internet.257 In 
2007, frustrated with the slow rate of publication online, 
Congress amended the law to require publication online in a 
searchable, sortable, and downloadable format.258 The 2007 
amendments also linked lobbying information with campaign 
contribution data reported to the FEC,259 so that users can 
better track financial ties between lobbyists and public 
officials. Thus, the amendments demonstrate how data regimes 
can be dynamic rather than static. 
But, as with many other disclosure-based regulatory 
schemes, researchers question how effectively campaign 
finance disclosures have achieved their stated goals of 
preventing corruption and the appearance of it.260 Despite 
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relatively thoughtful presentation and formatting of the data, 
the data themselves are not very reliable. Compliance with 
FEC reporting requirements is spotty, filings are often 
selective and incomplete (the FEC does not require filings to be 
complete to be accepted), FEC enforcement is limited in several 
important ways, data collection is not always standardized, and 
thus the data is often unreliable.261 To note just one example, 
although the FEC tracks campaign contributions, it does not 
track individual contributors well because there is no unique 
identifier assigned to them.262 Thus, the data “gives the illusion 
of transparency, but functions instead to obscure the most 
pertinent financial constituencies in a sea of data.”263 These 
design failures mean that the intended usersvoters, 
intermediaries, and regulatorsare relying on flawed data, 
even if it is presented in multiple formats.264 
Moreover, scholars have questioned at length whether 
voluminous campaign finance data succeeds in achieving its 
stated goals and have identified a long list of preconditions 
necessary for the data to do so. For example, Malbin and Gais 
identify several requirements that align with the wisdom 
applied to other disclosure-based regimesthe disclosure must 
be accurate, usable, and accessible, both to the intermediaries 
who can synthesize it, and to voters who might cast votes based 
on it.265 The preconditions are substantially similar to the 
conditions prescribed by Fung, Graham, and Weil (which I 
discuss in more detail in Part V, infra).266 Numerous articles by 
campaign finance scholars suggest specific improvements to 
the FEC’s data practices,  including how it collects, processes, 
and disseminates data, and enforces compliance.267 Simple 
fixes, like assigning unique identifiers to contributors and 
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allowing the FEC to conduct random audits, might greatly 
improve the quality of the data.268 
Finally, as with other data regimes, third-party 
intermediaries play an important role in translating and 
synthesizing the government’s campaign finance data. Groups 
like the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), the Campaign 
Finance Institute (CFI), and the Sunlight Foundation rely on 
FEC data to provide more digestible information to the 
public.269 Indeed, an old 2002 survey found that political 
journalists relied on the CRP website more than any other, 
with the FEC’s own site ranking third.270 Another group called 
MAPlight.org mashes up the publicly available voting records 
of members of Congress with campaign finance data, trying to 
find correlations.271 MapLight gathers data from not only the 
FEC, but also from the CRP, which runs OpenSecrets.org and 
FollowTheMoney.org (for California data).272 However, because 
the FEC data is so flawed, scholars worry that it is not suitable 
for use by researchers and other informational intermediaries 
who might otherwise be able to extrapolate larger patterns or 
trends.273 Thus, the FEC’s regime is characterized by noble 
sentiments but flawed data. 
Therefore, although there is low confidence in the FEC’s 
data sets, there remains clear demand for such data and 
somewhat feasible fixes that are likely to appeal to many 
interested parties, such as voters, watchdogs, and the 
disclosers themselves. Improved data qualityusing the 
methods recommended in Part V and the recommendations of 
earlier projectsshould enable better, more frequent uses of 
the information and perhaps even affect disclosers’ behavior. 
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B. The EPA’s Toxic Release Data 
Like campaign finance law, environmental law relies on 
public disclosure to regulate underlying conduct. 
Environmental scholars sometimes refer to this as “regulation 
by revelation”leveraging the threat of public backlash to 
change the underlying behavior that leads to pollution.274 As 
the EPA’s former General Counsel observed, “[i]nformation . . . 
can be a supplement, sometimes even an alternative, to 
regulation. When broadly available, information can change 
behavior.”275 
This logic undergirds several well-known environmental 
statutes that are predicated on disclosure, such as the Clean 
Air Act; the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act; the National Environmental Policy Act; the Safe Drinking 
Water Act; and the Toxic Substances Control Act.276 The 
commonality is that these statutes all “place affirmative duties 
on federal agencies to make information available to the 
public.”277 In combination, these laws “seem to provide a right 
of public access to virtually all environmental information in 
the hands of the federal government.”278 
In fact, perhaps the most well-known agency database 
dates back to 1986, when Congress passed the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, requiring the 
EPA to establish a national toxic chemical inventory, with the 
information “in a computer data base . . . accessible to any 
person.”279 The database became the Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI) program. 
The TRI program requires facilities to report their 
production and release of roughly 650 dangerous chemicals.280 
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The EPA first reported TRI data in 1989, and first published it 
online in 1998.281 Today’s version allows users to search for 
toxic release data by state, county, city, or ZIP code, and will 
generate a customized “factsheet” based on the query, listing 
all facilities in the geographic area and the quantity of 
chemicals they release.282 The data are presented in colorful 
chart, graph, and map forms.283 For each reporting facility, the 
EPA maintains a “Facility Profile Report” with more granular 
data regarding the amount of chemicals managed, released, or 
transferred.284 Still more data is available by link to each 
company’s full reports in the EPA’s Envirofacts database.285 
TRI has been widely hailed for having a “significant 
impact on firm-level emissions” and even inspiring several 
other disclosure-based regulatory efforts, both in the United 
States and overseas.286 The initial success of the TRI program 
even surprised the EPA and environmental groups who had 
toiled for years to regulate toxic pollution.287 Ten years after 
initiating the TRI program, the amount of pollution released 
had dropped by half.288 In fact, initial media interest in the 
program and the resulting threat of negative publicity 
appeared to have a powerful impact on companieseven before 
the first reports were required, executives of some companies 
promised to reduce their toxic outputs by as much as 90 
percent.289 As one of the earliest programs of its kind, the TRI 
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has been applauded by many as the best example of regulation 
via disclosure.290 
Perhaps inspired by its own success, the EPA now 
publishes hundreds of datasets online. The EPA website 
publishes so many datasets that it includes several landing 
pages that help users search for and navigate the data 
available.291 Some of the more well-known datasets after TRI 
include the EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online 
(ECHO) website, which allows users to search for recent and 
historical enforcement actions, including the last date of 
inspection.292 The EPA currently lists ninety-six datasets on its 
website,293 with 1,738 listed on Data.gov.294 The agency even 
hosts an online discussion forum for data developers.295 
Despite the initial success of TRI, Fung, Graham, and Weil 
found that in comparison with seven other disclosure regimes, 
toxic release disclosure was only moderately successful, at 
best.296 They found, in particular, that toxic release data is not 
embedded in potential users’ decision-making, as “[m]ost home 
buyers, renters, job seekers, consumers, and investors do not 
consider toxic pollution” when making decisions.297 The TRI 
data did succeed in better informing policymakers, such as 
Congress and the EPA itself.298 And many manufacturers 
quickly embedded the new data into their decision-making, 
recognizing the reputational and regulatory consequences.299 
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But researchers have gradually curbed their enthusiasm based 
on studies showing flaws in reporting (including inaccurate 
data) and longitudinal studies showing less impact on potential 
users’ and disclosers’ actual conduct.300 Scholars have long 
worried that EPA datasets are “patchy” and “unreliable.”301 
In the last decade, despite its success, the EPA has 
“drastically scaled back the information made public” under the 
TRI program.302 Prior to 2006, the EPA required facilities to 
report information regarding any chemical release over 500 
pounds.303 But a 2006 rule increased the threshold to 5,000 
pounds, provided the total annual release into the environment 
does not exceed 2,000 pounds.304 The GAO criticized the EPA’s 
rule as reducing the “quantity and detail of information” 
released to communities.305 Under the Trump administration, 
one can envision even more drastic changes to the TRI 
program. 
But these stories have not deterred scholars and 
policymakers who still believe that data is the path to 
environmental regulation. For example, Daniel Esty argues 
that “[a]s data become easier to analyze and disseminate, and 
dramatically less costly to acquire and use, our capacity to 
identify and solve environmental problems will increase 
substantially.”306 Indeed, he predicts that information 
technologies will enable an “environmental revolution perhaps 
as important as that which launched the modern 
environmental movement” in the 1960s.307 
Of course, even data optimists believe that there are 
significant challenges in producing environmental data that 
are reliable and usable.308 But, as in other fields, 
environmental scholars see great promise in third-party 
watchdogs and data intermediaries translating voluminous 
 
 300. Id. (citing studies). 
 301. Esty, supra note 4, at 156. 
 302. Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1791. 
 303. Toxics Release Inventory Burden Reduction Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 
76,932, 76,933 (Dec. 22, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372). 
 304. Id. at 76,937. 
 305. JOHN B. STEPHENSON, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT-TO-KNOW: EPA’S RECENT RULE COULD REDUCE 
AVAILABILITY OF TOXIC CHEMICAL INFORMATION USED TO ASSESS 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 16 (2007); Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1791 n.33. 
 306. Esty, supra note 4, at 119. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 171–74. 
 2018] REGULATION BY DATABASE 47 
data into usable heuristics for consumers, perhaps creating a 
race to the top among regulated firms.309 Nevertheless, not 
even the most well-resourced and well-meaning intermediaries 
can cure flawed data. The EPA’s many data sets, then, suffer 
more for quality than for quantity. 
C. The CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Data 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is the 
newest agency among those surveyed here, and its newness 
makes it interesting. Born of the 2008 financial crisis, the 
Bureau was “designed in a world of new technology.”310 In 
short, the CFPB “is a new agency operating under a new 
statute and is on the frontier of the open data trend.”311 The 
Bureau’s Office of Consumer Response operates a process for 
consumers to file complaints regarding financial products and 
services, which quite notably are published online by the CFPB 
in a massive, searchable Consumer Complaint Database, 
identifying companies by name.312 
The CFPB website allows consumers to file complaints for 
eleven categories of financial products, including mortgages, 
student loans, and credit cards.313 Complaints can specify the 
name of the company, the type of product or service at issue, 
the type of problem with it, and the consumer’s ZIP code, all of 
which the Bureau authenticates and sends to the company for 
a response.314 The published data is searchable and sortable, 
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and includes not only the company’s name, but also its 
response (if any) and whether the response was timely or 
further disputed by the customer.315 Companies select their 
responses via a pull down menu that includes options such as 
“Closed with monetary relief,” “Closed with non-monetary 
relief,” “Incorrect company,” and “In progress.”316 Companies 
have a total of sixty days to respond, and late responses are 
tagged by the CFPB as “Past due” or “No response” if the delay 
exceeds thirty days.317 Each complaint and response is 
published, but only if it meets numerous publication criteria.318 
In 2014, the Bureau expanded the database (reversing its 
previous position) by posting narrative commentary by 
consumers.319 It originally declined to do so, citing privacy and 
the risk of disclosing consumers’ personal information.320 But 
after considering industry objections (including the potential 
harm to company reputations) and devising ways to scrub the 
information of personally identifiable information, the Bureau 
finalized its plan to include consumer narratives in the 
Complaint Database.321 As a measure of symmetry, the Bureau 
proposed to allow companies to post their own narrative 
responses,322 but companies preferred to respond with a preset 
list of “structured” responses, such as “Company acted 
appropriately,” “Factual dispute,” “Misunderstanding,” and 
“Opportunity for improvement.”323 However, these responses 
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are optional; companies need not select one for publication.324 
Today, then, the Complaint Database includes narrative 
descriptions of consumers’ problems (if they choose to narrate 
them), which can make the problems more concrete and 
compelling than displaying relatively sanitized data entries 
alone.325 
The intended users of the Complaint Database are 
consumers, researchers, the Bureau, other regulators, and even 
the subjects of the complaints themselvescompanies.326 The 
Bureau and consumer groups emphasize that the primary 
intended beneficiaries are consumers, and publishing 
complaint data is a “public service” that can “empower” 
consumers and help them avoid “bad actors” in these 
markets.327 The Bureau itself emphasizes that “disclosure is 
one of the best tools government agencies can use.”328 Former 
Bureau Director Richard Cordray encouraged “the public, 
including consumers, the companies that serve them, analysts, 
data scientists, civic hackers, developers, policymakers, 
journalists, and academics, to analyze, augment, and build on 
the public database.”329 Bureau staff also hope that 
intermediaries develop mobile apps and other information 
products based on complaint data.330 
This latter aspirationthat intermediaries will use the 
government’s datais being realized, at least modestly so far. 
Academics are publishing empirical analyses of the CFPB’s 
data.331 Public interest research groups (PIRGs) are producing 
reports of certain financial product categories, like credit cards 
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and debt collection, based on Bureau data.332 In 2015, the 
rankings-crazed U.S. News & World Report ranked credit cards 
by relying, in part, on data from the Consumer Complaint 
Database.333 
Similar to other agencies, the CFPB hopes that the act of 
data publication itself will encourage companies to improve 
their underlying behavior.334 Bureau staff report that 
complaints have inspired some companies to address potential 
problems of their own, such as long customer service phone 
trees.335 Indeed, one of the Bureau’s original aspirations was 
that published complaints would encourage companies to 
compete in a race to the top, based on how they handled 
customer service and customer complaints.336 Management 
consulting firms now advise companies to “turn what they hear 
from the CFPB’s consumer complaint database into a business 
advantage.”337 Bureau staff also report that some companies 
have tied executive compensation to how well the company has 
responded to published complaints.338 In short, the Bureau sees 
its role somewhat modestly as a publisherproviding a 
window into a dialogue between companies and their 
customers.339 Once complaints are published, “[t]he 
marketplace of ideas then does the rest.”340 
Of course, the Consumer Complaint Database has not been 
without controversy, particularly to the firms identified in it. 
Firms and industry groups filed scores of public comments 
objecting to Bureau proposals to publish complaint data. The 
objections fall into seven general categories: (i) it is unfair to 
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publish complaints that are not verified by the Bureau; (ii) the 
complaints are self-selecting and thus are non-random and 
non-representative of customer experiences; (iii) the data lack 
context and might appear to be endorsed by the Bureau; (iv) 
the data are susceptible to manipulation and fraud; (v) the 
companies will suffer reputational harm in the media and 
might draw the attention of plaintiffs’ lawyers; (vi) the 
database is overinclusive because it includes complaints that 
are not necessarily legal or regulatory violations; and (vii) the 
Bureau lacks statutory authority to publish complaint data 
online.341 The Bureau responded at length to these objections 
in the Federal Register, showing a basic sensitivity to industry 
concerns, though disagreeing with industry conclusions that 
the Bureau should not publish the data online.342 
Moreover, the Bureau has fielded industry complaints 
about the database in several formats, including in public 
comments filed during notice and comment periods, in letters 
to the Director, and in complaints to the Bureau’s 
Ombudsman.343 The Federal Reserve’s Office of Inspector 
General, which has oversight responsibility for the CFPB, has 
audited the database “to assess the effectiveness of the 
[CFPB’s] controls over the accuracy and completeness of its 
public-facing Consumer Complaint Database.”344 Still, the 
database remains a target for industry, and a bill proposed in 
the 115th Congress would remove it from the public domain,345 
sparking an outcry from consumer watchdogs and public 
interest groups.346 
Thus, as a new database being run by a new agency, the 
Consumer Complaint Database continues to be refined and 
new uses (and objections) continue to emerge. Although the 
database seems well-designed to defuse potential criticisms, it 
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is still susceptible to being undermined by an unsympathetic 
Trump administration and a Republican-led Congress, per the 
pending bill.347 Nevertheless, the CFPB’s efforts can serve as a 
model for other agencies considering publishing consumer 
reports or complaints.348 
D. The CPSC’s Product Safety Data 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission’s database, 
SaferProducts.gov, enjoys more clear statutory authority and 
attention from Congress than most agency databases. Since the 
1970s, Congress has required the CPSC to “protect the public 
against unreasonable risks of injury” and “assist consumers in 
evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products.”349 
But in 2008, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act, requiring the Commission to create a 
searchable online database of product safety incidents.350 The 
law required the database to include “reports of harm relating 
to the use of consumer products,” including reports from 
consumers, physicians, state and local governments, and 
others.351 Each report must describe the product or substance 
at issue, identify the manufacturer or labeler, and describe the 
harm reported.352 Supporters hailed the effort to “empower 
consumers,” “expedite recall disclosure,” and “enhance a 
family’s right to know about dangerous and defective products 
on the market.”353 The CPSC launched SaferProducts.gov in 
March 2011.354 
Today, SaferProducts.gov includes a searchable online 
database of thousands of “reports of harm” related to identified 
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products.355 Like the CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database, 
the site has a portal for users to report incidents and a portal 
for companies to respond to them.356 The database is keyword-
searchable with advanced search options that include product 
name, company or brand name, and the product model.357 The 
advanced search also allows users to search for incidents by 
date, location, the “Victim’s Age,” and by “Injury Information,” 
including reports of death.358 
Interestingly, the Act also requires the CPSC to “provide 
clear and conspicuous notice to users of the database that the 
Commission does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or 
adequacy of the contents of the database.”359 As such, 
SaferProducts.gov includes a disclaimer that tracks this 
language almost verbatim.360 
An innovation in SaferProducts.gov that might be 
emulated by other agency databases361 is that the CPSC allows 
manufacturers to comment on reports and object to 
inaccuracies. This feature derives from the Act itself, which 
dictates that the CPSC “shall” provide manufacturers and 
labelers an opportunity to comment on incident reports and 
request that such comments be included in the report posted 
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online.362 Likewise, the CPSC must consider objections that 
any information in a report is “materially inaccurate,”363 which 
the CPSC defines as information “that is false or misleading, 
and which is so substantial and important as to affect a 
reasonable consumer’s decision-making about the product.”364 
Congressional attention to the validity of CPSC reports is not 
an accident. A series of inaccurate product safety warnings 
inspired Congress to amend the Consumer Product Safety Act 
in 1981 to improve procedural safeguards for Commission 
announcements.365 
The procedures for SaferProducts.gov are already being 
tested. In a recent case, Company Doe v. Tenenbaum, a 
company anonymously challenged an inaccurate product safety 
report in the database.366 The court found that the CPSC 
database “bears the Government’s stamp of approval through 
its publication on an official website that, by its terms, is a 
repository of reports regarding ‘unsafe products.’”367 The court 
sustained the company’s challenge, somewhat remarkably,368 
finding that the CPSC posting “materially inaccurate” 
information on SaferProducts.gov was not only “final agency 
action” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but also 
violated the CPSC’s own regulations.369 In the vast majority of 
similar cases, courts find that negative statements or other 
adverse public disclosures by agencies are not “final” under the 
APA and thus cannot support a cause of action against the 
government.370 The CPSC litigation thus could provide a 
roadmap for other litigants similarly aggrieved. 
Although SaferProducts.gov’s pre- and post-publication 
procedures might serve as a useful model for other agency 
databases, challenges certainly remain. For instance, it is not 
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clear how often consumers use the data to make purchasing 
decisions (perhaps the data is more useful to distributors and 
others in the supply chain), nor is it clear whether publishing 
the data inspires manufacturers to improve product safety 
apart from other requirements. And presentation remains 
critical. A GAO review found that some users were confused 
about the purpose of SaferProducts.gov, viewing it as a site 
featuring safe rather than unsafe products.371 The “upbeat” 
name of the database might have contributed to such 
misperceptions.372 The GAO also found that although the 
CPSC had used various methods to inform consumers about 
SaferProducts.gov (which at the time generated at least 
100,000 page visits a month), including use of social media, the 
agency could do more to publicize the resource.373 
Perhaps third-party informational products could leverage 
the data more effectively—for example, by creating mobile 
phone apps that can scan products in the aisle and display a 
brief product safety profile generated by data from 
SaferProducts.gov. Or, large online retailers like Amazon.com 
might find novel uses for such data, triangulating it with user 
reviews. Like other agencies, the CPSC’s open government 
website allows users to download raw data files, with 
voluminous links to the agency’s open data plans.374 Third-
party intermediaries might be particularly helpful at 
translating “big” product safety data into comparative ratings 
accessible to ordinary consumers. 
E. Medicare’s Quality Data 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
administers Medicare, our federal health insurance program 
for the elderly and chronically disabled. Because Medicare pays 
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thousands of nongovernmental physicians, hospitals, and other 
types of providers for care, beneficiaries often must choose 
among multiple local providerssometimes scores or even 
hundreds of such providers. But for a Medicare beneficiary that 
needs cardiac surgery, for example, choosing a specific surgeon 
in a specific hospital can be daunting.375 
To facilitate such decisions, CMS operates five searchable 
databases that compare Medicare providersHospital 
Compare,376 Physician Compare,377 Nursing Home Compare,378 
Home Health Compare,379 and Dialysis Facility Compare.380 
The search functions all work in roughly the same way. Users 
can search for providers by city, state, or ZIP code, and then 
view a list of results within a twenty-five mile radius, each 
sortable by different criteria. For example, the Nursing Home 
and Dialysis Facility databases allow users to sort facilities 
based on how they rate on a five-star scale.381 Hospitals are 
sortable by distance, by whether they offer emergency services, 
and by “hospital type.”382 Home Health facilities are listed by 
the type of care offered, such as physical therapy and 
occupational therapy.383 Physician searches are more 
complicated (and are probably the least useful of the five), 
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requiring the user to also search for a physician’s name, 
specialty, or medical condition to help narrow the results.384 
The five databases offer quite distinct data on “quality.” 
Hospital Compare includes data on over 4,000 hospitals 
nationwide,385 allowing users to compare up to three hospitals 
at a time, using six categories: “Survey of Patients’ 
Experiences,” “Timely & Effective Care,” “Complications, 
Readmissions & Deaths,” “Use of Medical Imaging,” and 
“Payment & Value of Care.” Each tab, moreover, includes 
several subcategories of information. For example, “Timely & 
Effective Care” is divided into ten subcategories, such as 
“Heart Attack Care” and “Stroke Care.”386 Results are 
compared to state and national averages as reference points. 
The data displayed, however, are less satisfying than the 
categories might suggest. A frustrating proportion of data for 
hospitals is listed as “Not Available,” with numbered footnotes 
explaining why.387 The tab titled “Payment & Value of Care” 
might tantalize health policy wonks, but unfortunately, 
comparative data often is not displayed directly (e.g., “Get 
Results for This Hospital” is displayed when searching for 
Medicare spending per beneficiary) or meaningfully (e.g., “No 
Different than the National Average Payment” is frequently 
displayed). Also, “Value of Care” metrics tend to display charts 
full of “No Different than the National Rate” and “No Different 
than the National Average Payment.” 
An afternoon on Hospital Compare leaves one with the 
impression that there are probably too many categories and 
subcategories of data for the average person to make 
meaningful comparisons, particularly when much of the data is 
“Not Available.” Thus, although CMS touts Hospital Compare 
as “an important tool for individuals to use in making decisions 
 
 384. Physician Compare: About the Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/staticpages/data/abouttheda 
ta.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6NDV-4TG7]. 
 385. What is Hospital Compare?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/ 
hospitalcompare/About/What-Is-HOS.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https:// 
perma.cc/ZFG3-DC4C]. 
 386. The ten categories are Heart Attack Care, Heart Failure Care, Pneumonia 
Care, Surgical Care, Emergency Department Care, Preventative Care, Children’s 
Asthma Care, Stroke Care, Blood Clot Prevention & Treatment, and Pregnancy & 
Delivery Care. 
 387. Hospital Compare, Footnotes, MEDICARE.GOV,  https://www.medicare.gov/ 
hospitalcompare/Data/Footnotes.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) [https://perma. 
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about health care options,” it is probably more successful at 
meeting CMS’s other aspiration as “a way to encourage 
accountability of hospitals for the care they provide to 
patients.”388 Still, given how incomplete the data is, it is 
questionable whether it meets even this goal. 
Physician quality data is even more limited, perhaps 
reflecting physicians’ longstanding concerns over reputation 
and liability.389 Physician Compare includes only directory-type 
information, such as the name and location of the physician, 
hospital admitting privileges, and information about 
physician’s education and board certifications. But there are 
few quality metrics. Physician Compare does feature a 
Physician Quality Reporting System, but it merely asks 
physicians to report whether they follow certain best 
practices.390 Physicians who report to CMS are then given 
performance scores. Unfortunately, the system is voluntary, 
and only some Physician Compare profiles include their 
performance scores.391 Although there are over 200 reportable 
quality measures, few are listed on Physician Compare.392 
 
 388. Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective 
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2006 Rates, 70 Fed. Reg. 47,278, 47,420 (Aug. 
12, 2005). 
 389. For a discussion of how transparency often challenges professional 
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reputation, see William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical 
Error, in ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 159 (Virginia A. 
Sharpe, ed. 2004). 
 390. For a list of examples, see Physician Compare, Physician Quality 
Reporting System (PQRS), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www. 
medicare.gov/physiciancompare/staticpages/data/pqrs.html (last visited Aug. 6, 
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quality measure performance scores on their Physician Compare profile 
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are many reasons why health care professionals and group practices do 
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methods. However, only certain measures reported through some of the 
reporting methods are currently available. Over time, more quality 
measures will be added to Physician Compare and more health care 
professionals and group practices will have measures available. 
Id. 
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Still, the star ratings available on databases like Nursing 
Home Compare and Dialysis Facility Compare are easily 
accessible across a number of facilities and probably do help 
users searching for facilities nearby. Of course, Medicare 
quality data has many potential uses for many potential 
audiences, ranging from patients looking to choose the best 
surgeon or hospital, to providers evaluating their own 
performance, to policymakers seeking to understand broader 
trends in care.393 
These databases had humble beginnings. In 2005, CMS 
first published ten different quality measures for hospitals 
across the United States, sprouting from a partnership 
between CMS and the Hospital Quality Alliance.394 In 
subsequent years, CMS has continued to add data from a 
variety of sources, including patient experience ratings, 
mortality rates for certain conditions, and hospital readmission 
rates, among many others.395 Today’s Compare databases are 
an amalgam of data from a variety of sources, gradually added 
like ornaments to a Christmas tree.396 
Perhaps the richest potential source of data is Medicare 
claims data. CMS processes over a billion Medicare claims each 
year,397 with each claim including multiple data points, 
including whom Medicare is paying and for what. Medicare 
claims data have long been used by academics, government 
researchers, and providers themselves to better understand the 
U.S. health care system.398 The growth of “big data” in health 
 
 393. Madison, supra note 30, at 1625. 
 394. Id. at 1626; Hospital Compare, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/quality-initiatives-patient-assessment-instruments 
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 398. Madison, supra note 30, at 1609–10. 
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care, in fact, roughly parallels and depends on the growth and 
accessibility of Medicare claims data.399 
Although Medicare has released various data to the public 
for years, CMS was long restricted from releasing physician 
claims data by court order.400 In 2014, a year after the order 
was lifted, CMS released claims data for over 880,000 
providers.401 The trend has been followed by statessixteen of 
which have created all-payer claims databases that compile 
claims data from almost all payers in the state, including 
public and private insurers.402 However, in 2016 the Supreme 
Court threw a wrench in these efforts when it interpreted 
federal law as preempting state laws mandating reporting from 
self-insured employer plans.403 As is common for many data 
regimes, agencies often take two steps forward, then one step 
back. 
Traditionally, claims data has meant merely payment 
data, without regard to the quality of care being provided. In 
2003, Congress amended Medicare’s payment formulas to 
encourage hospitals to report quality data,404 and today over 
1,300 hospitals report data about infection rates, mortality 
rates, and other quality indicators in order to boost their 
Medicare reimbursements,405 all of which feed into the 
Hospital Compare site. Medicare extended these incentives 
from hospitals to physicians in 2006 and, by 2017 will require 
it.406 Yet, realizing that not everyone is covered by Medicare, 
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a.html [https://perma.cc/WJ8R-M93R]. 
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(Dec. 8, 2016). 
 403. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S.Ct. 936 (2016) (invalidating a 
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of ERISA preemption). 
 404. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 501(b), 117 Stat. 2066, 2289 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 
1395ww(b)(3)(B)). 
 405. Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496, 50,678–80 (Aug. 19, 2013). 
 406. Madison, supra note 30, at 1613; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., PHYSICIAN QUALITY REPORTING SYSTEM (PQRS) OVERVIEW 2–3 (Aug. 8, 
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Congress required CMS to release broad swaths of Medicare 
claims data regarding hospital care, physician care, 
prescription drugs, and other goods and services to enable 
private entities to add Medicare data to other data, on the 
condition that such entities generate publicly accessible quality 
ratings.407 Thus, various data sources are being combined in 
novel ways. 
Nevertheless, scholars have long questioned the utility of 
performance data and report cards in the health industry,408 
and disclosure more generally has long been a point of interest 
to health law scholars.409 Patients report that they seldom rely 
on publicly available data or even more comprehensible report 
cards of physicians, hospitals, or procedures.410 A 2012 survey 
found that only 15 percent of patients reviewed online quality 
rankings or reviews when choosing doctors or hospitals, with 
the most frequent users being the most educated middle-aged 
users.411 Patients frequently are not aware of the information, 
do not understand it, or do not use it.412 Indeed, of the 
numerous disclosure regimes analyzed by Fung, Graham, and 
Weil, they found patient safety disclosures to be among the 
least effective, due to the complexity of the information, 
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misinterpreted, and the risk of strategic behavior by 
providers.413 
As a result, CMS has tried to “shrink” the voluminous and 
varied data by translating them into star ratings, using a five-
star scale.414 Five stars represents facilities that are “much 
above average,” four stars are “above average,” three stars are 
“average,” and so on.415 Users can access the underlying data 
on the same site, including charts comparing each facility to 
the state and national averages. 
More problematic is that studies reveal that those being 
measuredhospitals, physicians, and other providerscan 
respond in perverse ways to protect their ratings. Providers 
have been known to avoid sicker or more complicated patients 
for fear of compromising their scores on outcomes 
measurements.416 For example, a study of cardiac surgery 
report cards in Pennsylvania found that cardiac surgeons 
responded to the new disclosure requirement by becoming more 
reluctant to operate on sicker patients.417 The data is decidedly 
mixed, however. For every finding that public reporting of 
mortality rates reduced the rate of mortality, there are reports 
of selection bias by surgeons avoiding more severe, complex 
cases.418 
Moreover, despite the prevalence of doctor and hospital 
ratings and report cards, it is not clear whether consumers 
really want them: “Most consumers do not believe clinical 
quality varies significantly across doctors, hence the low 
consumer demand for clinical quality report cards.”419 One 
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study found that less than one percent of patients knew how 
their hospital or surgeon was rated under mandated ratings 
systems.420 Thus, ratings might be better in theory than in 
practice, at least for now. 
CMS’s ratings have also generated litigation. A nursing 
home in Illinois sued Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and CMS for mistakenly calculating its star 
rating on Nursing Home Compare, giving the facility two stars 
out of five rather than four.421 The mistaken star rating was 
published on the CMS website, which did not correct it for 
almost two years.422 The nursing home argued that HHS and 
the Illinois Department of Public Health, which conducted the 
underlying inspections, had violated its procedural due process 
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.423 The 
district court found that although the nursing home’s low star 
rating probably did affect its reputation, “reputational harm 
does not require due process protection.”424 The court agreed 
with the government that although a “mistaken rating could 
have caused some potential patients to look elsewhere for their 
care,” it did not rise to a property interest.425 To qualify, the 
nursing home would have to show that the reputational harm 
also included some sort of “change in legal status,” as required 
by the “stigma-plus” test.426 But the nursing home did not 
present evidence that there was any such change in legal 
statussuch as a ban on referrals to the facility, a change in 
licensing status or reimbursement status, or some other 
tangible harm.427 Thus, the court called the mistake (and the 
nearly two-year delay in fixing it) “unfortunate,” but not 
something rising to a liberty or property interest protected by 
due process.428 
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Still, quality ratings and other disclosure-based regulation 
remains all the rage in health policy,429 with contemporary 
proposals littered with patient surveys, outcomes data, star 
ratings or rankings, and of course federal databases like those 
mentioned above that combine many of these data points.430 
Again, scholars have long been aware of the benefits, burdens, 
and limitations of using disclosure as a regulatory tool in 
health care.431 Yet, it is possible, if not probable, that efforts to 
replace the Affordable Care Act432 will rely heavily on 
disclosure to facilitate market-based reforms. 
F. The FDA’s Adverse Event Data 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) maintains 
several online databases that track problems with the products 
and companies it regulates. For example, the agency publishes 
several enforcement databases that allow users to search for 
FDA inspections,433 warning letters,434 recalls,435 and 
enforcement reports.436 The FDA also maintains a database of 
good newsagency product approvals.437 But perhaps the most 
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well-known FDA databases are those that track adverse events 
associated with pharmaceuticals and medical devices. 
The FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) 
includes a database of medication errors and adverse drug 
events reported to the agency.438 Adverse event reporting dates 
back at least thirty-five years, and perhaps even longer, when 
the agency received reports by paper.439 Manufacturer reports 
are required by regulation,440 but reports by health care 
professionals and consumers are only voluntary.441 
Evolving from previous iterations,442 today’s database 
remains primarily a tool for the FDA to monitor safety 
problems, rather than a tool aimed for use by the general 
public. In fact, the FAERS “database” is not really searchable 
to most users. The FAERS website includes aggregate 
statistics, as well as links to raw data files that include 
individual case reports.443 But the raw data files are published 
only in quarterly increments,444 and are not amenable to 
simple searches, as the agency notes (“A simple search of 
FAERS data cannot be performed with these files by persons 
who are not familiar with creation of relational databases”).445 
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The FDA also instructs potential users to request individual 
case safety reports by submitting a FOIA request.446 Individual 
reports are accessible, however, by searching the FDA’s 
MedWatch website, which aggregates “clinically important 
safety information” for “human medical products,” including 
drugs, devices, and biologics.447 
The device counterpart to FAERS is MAUDE 
(Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience), a 
database of device adverse events,448 which the agency began 
collecting in 1984.449 Today, MAUDE includes both mandatory 
and voluntary adverse event reports, with downloadable data 
files, including reports dating back to the 1990s and an online 
searchable database covering the last ten years.450 The 
MAUDE database allows users to search for medical devices 
that may have malfunctioned or caused death or serious 
injury.451 Users can search by a pull down menu of product 
problems, by the class of product, or by manufacturer, model, 
or brand name.452 Like FAERS, MAUDE is designed to help 
the FDA monitor emerging product safety problems, but unlike 
FAERS, the centralized search function makes the data more 
accessible to lay users. 
Like other agencies, the FDA is trying to publish FAERS, 
MAUDE, and other databases in more user-friendly formats on 
its Open FDA site.453 The site, launched in 2014, includes 
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separate pages for food products, drugs, and devices, with all 
three including enforcement reports, and the drug and device 
pages, including adverse event databases.454 Open FDA 
publishes both individual reports and larger trend analyses. 
For example, as of March 2016, the site included almost 5.9 
million records in its adverse drug event database dating back 
to 2004.455 Open FDA includes extensive data tools and 
downloadable raw data files, obviously directed at third-party 
users. 
Also like other agencies, the FDA is beginning to 
incorporate multiple data sources to pursue regulatory goals, in 
this case uncovering trends with medical product safety. In 
2007, Congress required HHS and the FDA to coordinate with 
non-FDA sources, including “public, academic, and private 
entities” to “link and analyze safety data from multiple 
sources,” with an idea of uncovering emerging product safety 
risks.456 The goal was to include at least 100 million patients in 
the dataset by 2012.457 Called the FDA Sentinel Initiative, the 
effort has been designed to monitor product safety across 
different data sources, including data from Medicare, the 
Veterans Health Administration, and large private health 
insurers.458 
But again, like other databases, the FDA’s adverse event 
databases are not always complete or accurate. A 2011 study 
found widespread errors and incomplete reports filed in 
MedWatch, including more than 25 percent of reports using 
inaccurate product names.459 More than most agencies, then, 
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the FDA includes prominent disclaimers of the accuracy and 
reliability of its data.460 For example, the MAUDE database 
includes the following disclaimer: 
Although [Medical Device Reports] are a valuable source of 
information, this passive surveillance system has 
limitations, including the potential submission of 
incomplete, inaccurate, untimely, unverified, or biased data. 
In addition, the incidence or prevalence of an event cannot 
be determined from this reporting system alone due to 
potential under-reporting of events and lack of information 
about frequency of device use. 
* * * 
Confirming whether a device actually caused a specific 
event can be difficult based solely on information provided 
in a given report. Establishing a cause-and-effect 
relationship is especially difficult if circumstances 
surrounding the event have not been verified or if the device 
in question has not been directly evaluated.461 
Similarly, FAERS emphasizes that the “data does have 
limitations”: 
First, there is no certainty that the reported event (adverse 
event or medication error) was actually due to the product. 
FDA does not require that a causal relationship between a 
product and event be proven, and reports do not always 
contain enough detail to properly evaluate an event. 
Further, FDA does not receive reports for every adverse 
event or medication error that occurs with a product. Many 
factors can influence whether or not an event will be 
reported, such as the time a product has been marketed and 
publicity about an event. Therefore, FAERS data cannot be 
used to calculate the incidence of an adverse event or 
medication error in the U.S. population.462 
The Open FDA site also confronts users, via pop-up 
window, with a note of caution that “[t]his API is not for 
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clinical or production use. While we make every effort to ensure 
that data is accurate, you should assume all results are 
unvalidated.”463 Should policymakers settle for data of such 
quality? Are incomplete and unrepresentative data better than 
none? If so, how best can scarce resources be deployed to 
improve the accuracy, reliability, and usefulness of the FDA’s 
data? 
There remains great hope that modern tools like agency 
databases can improve drug safety, even if the data are 
imperfect, by combining FDA data with other data sources, like 
Medicare claims, for example.464 Thus, an alliance between the  
FDA and CMS to combine their data might help cure some 
defects in the FDA’s adverse event reporting systems.465 Still, 
policymakers might counter widespread underreporting by 
experimenting with automated monitoring systems relying on 
digital technologies. For example, digital pill trackers and 
other mobile monitoring devices might send automatic problem 
reports to the FDA,466 subject to pre- and post-publication 
safeguards described above. 
V. DESIGNING FOR OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE 
How can policymakers design databases that realize their 
many aspirations while minimizing their shortcomings and 
burdens? At core, how can policymakers ensure the quality and 
reliability of agency data, so that users trust the data being 
published?467 My first prescription is modesty. As Richard 
Craswell cautions, “people who expect disclosure laws to solve 
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almost every problemquickly, easily, and with very little 
costare doomed to have their expectations crushed.”468 The 
truth is that regulation by database requires just as many 
difficult design and implementation choices as any other form 
of regulation.469 The early successes of the CFPB’s Consumer 
Complaint Database and the CPSC’s SaferProducts.gov site, for 
example, are owed to several canny decisions by Congress and 
the agencies to ensure the quality of the data posted.470 It is a 
mistake, then, to assume that creating a public database is 
necessarily less difficult and more cost-effective than 
traditional regulation. 
Another important consideration is that agency databases 
vary widely in their purposes, scope, design, sources, and 
presentation. Although it is neither possible nor worthwhile to 
prescribe universal rules of thumb here, I try to highlight 
emerging best practices from the databases I have evaluated to 
date, in the hopes that these discussions will be useful to 
policymakers. Again, these recommendations build on, and in 
many ways exceed, those recently promulgated by ACUS.471 In 
short, the most successful disclosure regimes will carefully 
consider both data inputs (how data will be collected and from 
whom) and outputs (how the data will be published and 
presented).472 
I thus offer a series of recommendations that address both 
dimensions, proposing a decidedly modern role for the 
government as a “data steward.” For example, agencies must 
consider how to gather and process the data, including 
carefully choosing sources and crafting adequate pre- and post-
publication procedures to ensure data quality. Agencies also 
should not underestimate the costs required to generate and 
maintain their databases, as well as the potential overlap with 
agency enforcement and adjudication procedures. Finally, 
agencies should think carefully about potential audiences and 
users in deciding how to characterize and present the data. 
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A. Gathering and Processing the Data 
Policymakers should think carefully, and ideally in 
advance, about data inputs. Whose data will populate the data 
sets? How will it be gathered? To what extent will the agency 
try to verify, validate, or otherwise authenticate the data? And 
how will the agency handle contested data? 
As a threshold matter, it is particularly important that 
agencies identify reliable data sources. The irony here is that 
the internet not only facilitates many of the disclosures 
discussed in this Article, but also (by virtue of soliciting data 
from a variety of sources) raises problems with reliability.473 
Thus, government agencies can play an important role by 
ensuring that published data is credible.474 Indeed, because the 
very fact of publication by a government agency often signals 
credibility, it is incumbent on agencies to ensure the accuracy 
of data that purports to be objective.475 Notice-and-comment 
procedures might be useful in soliciting feedback on what 
sources are reliable and why. 
As Kristin Madison argues, the federal government is more 
than just a repository for datait is also a “data steward” 
responsible for actively managing the data it holds, helping to 
ensure its integrity.476 The CFPB, for example, does not verify 
that consumer complaints are “accurate” (in other words, that 
the conduct alleged in the complaint actually occurred), but 
does help “authenticate” that each complaint is made by an 
actual customer of the company, giving the company ample 
opportunity to identify false or fraudulent complaints.477 
Likewise, when Congress authorized SaferProducts.gov, it 
required the CPSC to consider objections that the information 
is “materially inaccurate.”478 Again, the CFPB and CPSC 
demonstrate two frameworks for active data stewardship. 
In short, agencies that purport to publish accurate and 
objective data should adopt procedures to these ends. As 
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emphasized in Part II, because “transparency” is frequently 
invoked to support disclosure, it is important to remember that 
“transparency” allows objects to be “seen without distortion.”479 
To the extent feasible, then, government databases should try 
to achieve genuine transparency rather than “translucency.”480 
Indeed, some scholars note that, inevitably, disclosure regimes 
created through the political process are forged by conflict and 
compromise, and thus generate only partial or imperfect 
transparency.481 But scholars also find that the more successful 
disclosure regimes tend to increase the accuracy and quality of 
the information they publish over time.482 Databases should be 
dynamic rather than staticconstant works in progress. 
Although initial design choices are important, agencies should 
not hesitate to tinker with data collection procedures if flaws in 
the data become apparent, as in the case of the EPA’s Toxic 
Release Inventory. 
1. Pre-Publication Procedures 
Data sets that purport to publish accurate, objective 
information should be buttressed, ideally, with both pre- and 
post-publication procedures that allow parties to request that 
any information not meeting these standards be corrected or 
retracted. Again, some of the newer agency databases provide 
parties with pre-publication procedures to comment on, 
challenge, or request corrections and retractions of information 
before publication.483 For example, by statute the CPSC must 
give companies whose products are reported to 
SaferProducts.gov the opportunity to comment on any Reports 
of Harm.484 The CPSC must consider objections that the 
information is “materially inaccurate,”485 and the Commission 
publishes these procedures in the C.F.R.486 There are clear 
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timelines for parties to object to alleged inaccuracies and for 
the CPSC to resolve disputes before publication.487 Likewise, 
the CFPB authenticates that complaints are coming from 
actual customers of the company.488 Bureau procedures allow 
companies to use an online company portal to verify a 
commercial relationship with the customer and post the 
company’s response.489 The Bureau also makes clear that each 
complaint, before being published in the database, must meet 
several publication criteria.490 Of all the databases discussed in 
Part IV, the CPSC and CFPB procedures serve as the best 
models for pre-publication quality control. 
2. Post-Publication Procedures for Contested Data 
Nevertheless, errors in published data sets are probably 
inevitable, no matter how robust the pre-publication 
procedures may be. As a result, policymakers should also 
consider post-publication procedures as a backstop to help 
ensure the quality and reliability of data. Scholars have long 
recognized that such procedures can be an important safety 
valve for parties named in agency publications, as legal 
recourse is generally not available.491 
Here, the controversial Information or Data Quality Act 
might be of help.492 The Act required the OMB to publish 
government-wide guidelines for “ensuring and maximizing the 
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information . . . 
disseminated by the government.”493 The Act applies broadly to 
“[f]ederal agency dissemination of public information, 
regardless of the form or format.”494 It also directed the OMB to 
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establish procedures that allow “affected persons to seek and 
obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated 
by the agency.”495 Per the OMB’s guidelines, dozens of federal 
agencies have published their own such guidelines and post-
publication procedures for correcting or retracting 
information.496 Although these procedures would seem to have 
clear application to agency databases, the OMB guidelines 
include two important exemptions. First, they exclude from the 
IQA’s coverage “opinions, where the agency’s presentation 
makes it clear that what is being offered is someone’s opinion 
rather than fact or the agency’s views.”497 Second, they exclude 
“adjudicative processes.”498 Thus, both exemptions could be 
read as excluding, for example, the CFPB’s Consumer 
Complaint Database, which might be fairly characterized as 
including “opinions” or even “adjudicative processes.”499 
Nevertheless, the IQA and resulting agency guidelines 
articulate both substantive and procedural values that 
agencies should observe. To ensure the quality and reliability 
of government-published information, there should be a safety 
valve that allows the subjects identified to request correction or 
retraction by the agency. 
A 2015 study by the GAO found eighty-seven publicly-
reported requests for corrections or retractions under the IQA 
sent to thirty agencies between 2010 and 2014.500 Although the 
agencies denied fifty-nine out of the eighty-seven  requests, the 
agencies made full corrections in eleven cases and partial 
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corrections in fifteen cases (two cases were unresolved as of the 
date of the report).501 For example, HHS updated information 
on several CDC websites regarding bicycle helmet safety data 
in response to a request made under CDC, HHS, and OMB 
data quality guidelines.502 Moreover, in fifteen of the fifty-nine 
cases denying the IQA request, the agency used alternative 
procedural mechanisms, usually systems that predated the 
IQA.503 In some cases, the agency engaged in long substantive 
exchanges on the accuracy, presentation, and usability of 
data.504 
Post-publication procedures might also reside outside, 
rather than inside, the agency. My review for ACUS, for 
example, considered whether independent bodies like the 
OMB, ombudsmen, or inspectors general might play a role in 
superintending disputes over agency data.505 
First, the OMB already exerts both centripetal and 
centrifugal pressures on agency data collection and publication 
practices. In addition to the OMB’s IQA guidelines, the 
Paperwork Reduction Act requires the OMB to preapprove 
significant information gathering efforts by agencies.506 The 
agency must explain to the OMB why it needs the information, 
why it has “practical utility,” and why it is relevant to the 
agency’s regulatory functions.507 Thus, the OMB can play a 
useful standardizing role. But it is not well suited to resolving 
disputes between agencies and regulated parties, and agencies 
may bristle at having to endure further layers of OMB review. 
Second, many agencies maintain an Office of the 
Ombudsman or its equivalent, which can field complaints 
about data published by agencies. For example, the CFPB’s 
Ombudsman has heard complaints about the Consumer 
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Complaint Database,508 and the FDA’s many ombudsmen have 
fielded complaints under the IQA.509 Ombuds can serve 
important customer service functions with regulated parties. 
As such, the use of ombuds in federal agencies has increased in 
recent years, as have calls for standards regarding their 
independence, duties, and information-providing roles.510 
A third option is review by agencies’ inspectors general. 
Inspectors general (IGs) are independent officers, directed by 
law to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in federal 
agencies.511 They also maintain, by design, crucial 
independence from agency heads, and thus can serve as an 
independent arbiter.512 They can also function as an avenue for 
fielding industry complaints.513 The Federal Reserve’s Office of 
Inspector General is, in fact, auditing the CFPB’s Consumer 
Complaint Database “to assess the effectiveness of the CFPB’s 
controls over the accuracy and completeness of the public 
complaint database.”514 
Finally, chief information officers (CIOs) within agencies 
might play an important role in not only answering important 
questions regarding database design, but also in participating 
in pre- and post-publication procedures described above. They 
are most likely to be informed of other agencies’ experiences 
and able to critically evaluate whether those models might 
translate well to their own data regimes. 
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3. Considering Costs 
Procedural safeguards can be essential for ensuring data 
quality, though they are not without cost. Too often 
government agencies try to achieve disclosure on the cheap.515 
Data collection and processing requires not just automation, 
but also human labor. Unfortunately, such labor is dismissed 
as the task of “data janitors” who receive inadequate 
compensation.516 The lack of sufficient infrastructure to ensure 
data quality can generate “big bad data”517—data that are 
voluminous but of low quality. Thus, meaningful data often 
require meaningful investment to create a sufficient 
information infrastructure. 
Moreover, posting the data online can be costly. Running 
an agency website is not a simple proposition. Web masters for 
federal websites must comply with at least two dozen different 
regulatory systems “[r]anging from privacy and usability to 
FOIA compliance to the demands of the Paperwork Reduction 
Act.”518 Although each separate requirement may stand on its 
own logic, together they can limit how agencies present data, 
and generally favor standardization above experimentation.519 
As Robinson and colleagues observe, “[a]s long as the 
government has a special role in the presentation and 
formatting of raw government data, certain desirable limits on 
what the government can do become undesirable limits on how 
the data can be presented or handled.”520 In this vein, 
nongovernmental intermediaries have proven useful in 
rendering government data more accessible and usable,521 as I 
discuss below in Section V.C. 
Finally, all this assumes that policymakers have already 
made the threshold decision to publish the data and accept 
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responsibility for data stewardship. But because data 
stewardship can be resource intensive, policymakers should 
think more critically in advance about which data regimes 
warrant the government’s scarce stewardship resources. Which 
databases might be especially useful to consumers, or 
particularly effective at inducing optimal behavior from 
regulated entities? And of existing databases, which low-
quality data sets might be worth salvaging? The FEC’s and 
FDA’s databases might underwhelm in several ways, but few 
would argue that more accurate, comprehensive campaign 
finance data or drug safety data would not be worthwhile. 
Thus, if stewardship is worth pursuing, limited resources 
dictate that it must be targeted stewardship, focusing on the 
data sets that are most likely to achieve the twin goals of being 
useful to target audiences and changing behavior.522 
4. Administrative Law Dimensions 
Most interesting, from an administrative law perspective, 
is that database publication procedures might be viewed as a 
unique species of agency adjudication and regulatory 
enforcement. Seen this way, database publication procedures 
fall along a continuum ranging from very minimal verification 
to more searching pre- and post-publication adjudication of 
contested data. No database regimes currently approach the 
full panoply of procedural safeguards that attach to more 
formal administrative adjudications, pursuant to statutory and 
due process requirements.523 But like traditional agency 
adjudications, the amount of “procedure” appropriate for 
database disputes will depend on what information each 
database includes, the regulatory goals of publishing the 
information, the statutory scheme in which it sits, and the cost 
and value of “getting it right” versus “making it public.” 
Another possibility is that legal sanctions begin to attach 
more formally and more forcefully to database reporting such 
that companies reporting inaccurate or incomplete data will 
face fines, penalties, and other measurable burdens in addition 
to any reputational damage. Could the Medicare program, for 
example, condition reimbursement on accurate data 
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reporting?524 Could plaintiffs or prosecutors use the federal 
false statements statute525 or the False Claims Act526 to punish 
material inaccuracies or misleading data reporting by 
regulated firms? Both laws are broad and powerful, and are 
deployed in increasingly creative ways. Their use in database 
reporting cases could raise novel statutory and due process 
questions about the procedural safeguards agencies have 
selected for specific databases. Moreover, such actions could be 
undermined by how agencies themselves “characterize” the 
data, including any disclaimers about the accuracy, reliability, 
or objectivity of the data. 
B. Characterizing the Data 
Because not all data will be objective in nature, verifiable, 
or even worth the cost of verifying, it is equally important that 
agencies accurately characterize the data they present, listing 
the sources and any important context or limitations for the 
data. 
1. Identifying Sources 
Databases should be labeled and characterized accurately, 
much as we expect of product labeling by industry.527 This is 
particularly so because government agencies are one of the 
most trusted sources of information, and the information they 
publish carries the imprimatur of the federal government.528 
Thus, agency databases should clearly identify the sources of 
their data. Agency databases should also indicate whether the 
data are contested, and detail steps the agency takes (or, more 
importantly, does not take) to resolve such contests.529 
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Data sets that do not purport to be accurate or objective 
might require special precautions. Federal databases can be 
populated with data from a variety of sourcesincluding 
consumers, regulated parties, or the agency itselfand each 
might require different quality controls and presentations.530 
For example, the FDA’s adverse event databases are populated 
by reports from manufacturers and users that a product may 
have been “associated” with an adverse event, without any firm 
claims as to causation.531 Similarly, being listed in the CFPB’s 
Consumer Complaint Database does not mean that a company 
has committed any legal violation; many complaints are simply 
“vague expressions of being wronged.”532 Just like the FDA 
does not verify whether a product caused a specific adverse 
event, the CFPB does not verify that a company even engaged 
in the conduct alleged in the consumer complaint. Doctors 
subject to “report cards” also lament that death and 
complication rates are presented without being normalized for 
treating riskier patient populations.533 Should such “data” even 
be published? For better or worse, routinely they are. 
2. Explaining Context, Limitations 
The solution, perhaps, is for agencies to represent the data 
accurately, which often means explaining the context and any 
limitations of the data. Several agencies already endeavor to do 
so. For example, in the FDA’s medical device database, the 
agency notes that its “surveillance system has limitations, 
including the potential submission of incomplete, inaccurate, 
untimely, unverified, or biased data.”534 The FDA’s adverse 
drug event database also notes that “there is no certainty that 
the reported event . . . was actually due to the product.”535 
Likewise, the CFPB disclaims that “[w]e don’t verify all the 
facts alleged in these complaints but we take steps to confirm a 
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commercial relationship between the consumer and the 
company.”536 Congress requires the CPSC’s SaferProducts.gov 
database to “provide clear and conspicuous notice to users of 
the database that the Commission does not guarantee the 
accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the contents of the 
database.”537 Although one court called the CPSC’s language 
“boilerplate” that “would not interest an ordinary consumer,”538 
providing appropriate context and disclosing the limitations of 
data is relatively easy and helps answer several criticisms of 
disclosure noted in Part III. 
A “reliable” database may depend not only on publishing 
accurate data (if that is what it purports to do), but also on 
publishing relatively complete and representative data. 
Industry commenters, for example, objected that the CFPB’s 
database of self-selected consumer complaints would 
necessarily be incomplete, nonrandom, and thus 
nonrepresentative of company performance and consumer 
experiences.539 The CFPB responded that the data are not 
portrayed as such, and promised to “inform consumers and any 
other public database users that the data reflect only the . . . 
complaints that consumers submit to the Bureau.”540 
Data selection or filtering criteria might thus generate 
published data that are technically accurate but misleading as 
a whole. Transparency initiatives often fail when 
“transparency is either not sufficiently mandatory or not 
applicable to categories of information that meaningfully 
contribute to public accountability.”541 Agencies with discretion 
to disclose information may tend to disclose “information that 
makes the administration look public spirited, effective, and 
efficient, but withhold information to the contrary.”542 The data 
chosen for publication may not paint a complete or 
representative picture. Thus, as Shkabatur argues, the answer 
for incomplete transparency may be even more 
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transparency.543 She finds support among scholars who argue 
that Congress should place affirmative disclosure duties on 
agencies, shifting away from the “passive” disclosure required 
by laws like FOIA that have been rendered as anachronisms in 
the Internet era.544 If it is neither possible nor cost-effective to 
publish comprehensive or representative data, the agency 
should provide adequate context for what is being published 
and explain why the dataset is incomplete. 
C. Presenting the Data 
Policymakers should also consider the “outputs” of agency 
databaseshow the data will be published, presented, and 
used. Thoughtful designs will evaluate the optimal format, size, 
and scope of the database, as well as the target audiences and 
their potential uses. 
1. Raw or Polished? 
First, data can be published in raw or relatively polished 
formats, with gradations in between. Should agencies rely on 
massive raw data dumps targeted at more sophisticated users? 
Or should they package, stylize, and distill the data for lay 
users? The trend, as noted above, is to publish data sets in both 
more polished, packaged formats and in raw, open data 
formats. The former requires agencies to think carefully about 
how to convey the information, and in what packagingwhich 
inevitably raises costs and includes normative judgment calls 
that might draw into question how objective or neutral the 
presentation is. But the latter (publishing raw data) is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. 
Historically, agencies have been reluctant to publish 
information in open, raw, machine-readable data formats 
(particularly information requested via FOIA). For example, 
2011 congressional testimony revealed that “[m]ost requests for 
correspondence and other documents are fulfilled by printing 
them, redacting, then re-scanning into unsearchable 
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images.”545 Yet, as far back as 2004, the OMB encouraged 
agencies to “provide all data in an open, industry standard 
format permitting users to aggregate, disaggregate, or 
otherwise manipulate and analyze the data to meet their 
needs.”546 And scholars continue to argue for agencies to 
publish data online in open, structured, and machine-readable 
formats such as XML, consistent with the Open Government 
Working Group’s recommendations.547 Thus, there is a clear 
trend toward publishing in raw, open formats. 
At the same time, some scholars argue that publishing 
data in raw, “naked” formats can itself serve as a barrier to 
access for nonprogrammers and others who are not able to 
understand or use such data.548 Raw government datasets 
might require, ironically, technically sophisticated 
intermediaries to decipher.549 Thus, open government efforts 
that encourage agencies to present data in a raw, naked, and 
“neutral” way may erect separate barriers to accessing and 
understanding the information. 
A related idea is that government transparency can exist 
on different planes, from “relative” to “absolute.” Relative 
transparency occurs when someoneusually the government 
or a data intermediary“relates” the data from one reporting 
entity to another for easy comparison. For example, star 
ratings, grades, and other distilling criteria essentially grade 
reporting entities on a curve. To wit, most users would 
understand that a hospital receiving one out of five stars on 
overall quality underperforms most other hospitals. But it is 
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much more difficult for users to understand what a two percent 
complication rate associated with cardiac surgeries performed 
at a specific facility should signal, as an absolute number. Of 
course, even “relative” transparency may not be particularly 
useful. If HospitalCompare.gov lists a hospital’s mortality rates 
as “[n]o different than the national average,” that might signal 
to users that they should not worry about that factor when 
selecting a hospital. But it could also mean that the national 
average is equally disappointing for everyone. Moreover, 
“relative” transparency is only realized after gathering 
“absolute” data points. But who should take on the task of 
turning absolute, raw data into relative, packaged 
comparisons?550 
Some argue that the government should focus its energies 
less on presenting packaged information and more on 
publishing “reusable data.”551 The idea, inspired by the 
engineering principle that separates data from interaction, is 
that agencies should worry less about designing user-friendly 
websites, and more about releasing raw data for 
nongovernmental users.552 Robinson and colleagues argue that 
the latter will be better able to experiment with how to present 
the data effectively, whether it be with advanced search 
functionalities, automated content analysis, indexing among 
multiple sources, and various data visualization tools.553 They 
call this new role for agencies an “invisible hand,” enabling a 
“marketplace of engineering ideas.”554 Some users will also 
value being able to access “genuine” data that is not mediated, 
framed, or translated by an intermediary (including, or even 
particularly, by the government).555 
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2. Big Data or Small Data? 
Disclosure enthusiasts often assume that more is better. 
But recently, scholars have begun to acknowledge that it is 
more important that information be accessible and usable, 
rather than simply available.556 Perhaps the relevant question, 
then, is not what policymakers think users need to know, but 
what users want to know.557 Disclosure policies that consider 
what information users want, and what they can comprehend, 
tend to be more successful over time.558 
Moreover, perhaps consumers do not necessarily need 
more data, but more advice.559 The opposite of making data 
“bigger,” of course, is making data “smaller”usually by 
simplifying, tailoring, and targeting the information to make it 
easier to process.560 Thus, rating systems and other 
information made available at the point of purchase could be 
particularly useful for consumers.561 Mere publication on a 
government website might not be particularly useful, unless 
intermediaries make the data available where and when it can 
be used. Such information is more likely to become embedded 
in the decisions targeted by the disclosure.562 Thus, databases 
that allow users to simplify complex information, or that allow 
experts to easily convert it to actionable advice (such as a 
ratings system or a reliable heuristic), will be more successful 
in achieving regulatory goals.563 Restaurant hygiene grades, for 
example, are more embedded in the decision of where to eat 
than complex and voluminous patient safety disclosures are in 
the decision of where to seek medical care.564 
Despite the current fascination with “big data,” many also 
appeal for simplification. Agencies are thinking more carefully 
today about ensuring the “utility” of data, perhaps owing in 
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part to the IQA.565 Moreover, notions of “utility” continue to 
evolve. For example, the Nutrition Facts label on food products 
has had some modest successconsumers report that they are 
increasingly aware of nutrition labeling and make decisions 
based on it.566 Still, as Ben-Shahar and Schneider note, even 
with nutrition labeling, which they call “the simplest and most 
understandable case of daily disclosures,” studies still find high 
levels of consumer confusion that largely correlate with low 
consumer literacy and numeracy.567 How much should these 
findings deter agency disclosure efforts? 
In general, ratings systems that communicate data that 
has been simplified and “translated” for lay users seem to enjoy 
moderate success.568 For example, there is evidence that simple 
letter grades for restaurant sanitation (from “A” to “C”) have 
led to cleaner restaurants in Los Angeles County.569 
Restaurants with high letter grades posted in their store 
windows saw an increase in revenues, and conversely, 
restaurants with the lowest “C” grades saw a decrease.570 More 
tellingly, prominent disclosure of these grades encouraged 
restaurants to improve their sanitation practices, which 
correlated with a significant local drop in hospitalizations 
related to food-borne illnesses.571 Thus, simple, 
comprehensible, and easily accessible ratings not only allowed 
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consumers to vote with their wallets, but also encouraged 
restaurants to compete based on cleanlinessundoubtedly the 
underlying motivation of the letter grade system.572 
For disclosure policies to succeed on multiple levels, then, 
they must affect not only the decision-making of consumers 
and regulatory beneficiaries, but also the decision-making of 
the discloserthe regulated party.573 Thus, effective disclosure 
systems become “doubly embedded.”574 The way disclosure 
policies affect discloser behavior is intuitiveby affecting their 
profits, market share, and/reputation.575 Disclosers may 
change their behavior, in fact, simply in anticipation that 
releasing information may affect one of these three things. 
Thus, agencies may choose two very different courses: 
massive raw data dumps intended for sophisticated 
intermediaries, or highly distilled presentations intended for 
lay users. The correct choice, if one must be made, depends 
very much on the data and what the agency hopes to achieve by 
publishing it. 
On one hand, simplified ratings or grades are able to distill 
dozens or even hundreds of different complex criteria into a 
single understandable metric, like restaurant hygiene grades, 
hospital star ratings, or five-star crash safety ratings, which 
are based on complex engineering standards and test 
results.576 Ratings and grades also combat the problem of 
overdisclosure. Scholars that have evaluated the effectiveness 
of mandatory disclosure regimes sometimes observe that 
parties can “overdisclose” information to try to “overwhelm and 
distract” the intended audience.577 Ratings can ameliorate this 
problem. 
On the other hand, sometimes efforts to make the complex 
more understandable fail, as evidenced by the vague five-color 
scheme for communicating the threat of a terrorist attack.578 
Unlike dirty restaurants or unsafe cars, it is hard for most 
people to understand the significance of the terror threat 
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changing from yellow to orange, and more importantly, how to 
act on that signal.579 Thus, not all data is so easily distilled. 
Given these considerations, should agencies design 
databases to be accessible to the lay public, or to be used by 
more sophisticated information intermediaries? An ideal 
answer is “both,” of course. To maximize accessibility, the data 
should be available in multiple formats, as many agencies now 
recognize, and as Data.gov demonstrates. If “both” is not a 
feasible option, the agency must decide whether “big data” or 
“small data” better achieve regulatory ends, including the 
relative costs of both approaches. 
3. Intermediaries and Collaborative Data 
Designing databases for use by third-party information 
intermediaries is compelling for several reasons.580 Publicly-
minded watchdogs like Pro Publica, the Sunlight Foundation, 
and the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) can serve a 
translational role, sifting large amounts of data into more 
understandable bits.581 Although these organizations focus on 
government transparency, they also can (and do in fact) help 
extract and translate information about regulated parties.582 
Even complex datasets that are not translated by agencies into 
ratings, grades, or other digestible metrics can be translated by 
thoughtful intermediaries. For example, various consumer 
groups have tried to translate toxic release data into more 
user-friendly websites.583 Thus, even raw data sets can be 
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repurposed for lay users like consumers and other regulatory 
beneficiaries. Indeed, Fung, Graham, and Weil found that the 
most successful disclosure regimes “featured strong groups 
representing information users, offered benefits to at least 
some information disclosers, and provided comprehensible 
content.”584 
However, translating voluminous, complex government 
data requires not only minimum technical and programming 
expertise, but also a basic understanding of the agency and its 
regulatory framework (and perhaps also an understanding of 
the regulated industry). The number of organizations that can 
fit comfortably into such a Venn diagram might be quite small. 
Indeed, even proponents of publishing raw government data 
concede that it is not immediately accessible to most lay 
users.585 And some doubt that these organizations derive their 
value from information supplied by the government, rather 
than from their own surveys and information-collecting 
activities.586 Still, the fact that there are individuals like 
Joshua Tauberer (who created Govtrack.us in his spare 
time)587 and Carl Malamud (who painstakingly made SEC data 
available online)588 demonstrate that the barriers are far from 
insurmountable. Moreover, these extraordinary individual 
efforts inspired the government to publish the data in open 
formats.589 
Unsurprisingly, agencies are also discovering that data is 
becoming a more collaborative endeavor. There is optimism 
that once raw data is published, the private, public, and 
nonprofit sectors will make the data more accessible and useful 
to their constituents.590 Fung and colleagues note what 
happened with the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory, as consumer 
groups like Scorecard and RTK refined the data and made it 
more user friendly, while the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association launched its own site emphasizing not only 
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companies’ improving safety data, but also the number of jobs 
they created and taxes they paid by ZIP code.591 
As such, we might be experiencing a major shift in the 
government’s informational role from controller to facilitator.592 
Indeed, modern agencies may be best suited to facilitating 
rather than controlling informationthat is, gathering and 
publishing data, ensuring its quality, and then enabling the 
private and nonprofit sectors to maximize its uses.593 Data 
users might also become contributors, as in the case of 
consumers who report food poisoning from restaurants and 
thus supplement relatively infrequent restaurant 
inspections.594 Just as the CFPB endeavors, the government 
can serve as an aggregator of disparate data sources. 
Craswell calls this “government-aided disclosures (GADs),” 
in which the government creates a baseline for disclosure, but 
allows companies to use the information dynamically or go 
beyond the baseline in some way.595 Such disclosures are 
mandated by government but are also integrated by disclosers 
because the information is useful to consumers or users.596 
Another factor that improves success is whether the 
information varies between disclosers, such that disclosers 
have an incentive to race to the top.597 Cigarette brands have 
little incentive to highlight the Surgeon General’s mandatory 
warnings, because the same preset warnings rotate among all 
products regardless of manufacturer, but they may have more 
incentive to reduce the tar and nicotine content of their 
products, which varies from brand to brand.598 Thus, data can 
serve as an important differentiator between competitors, and 
they might spend their own resources publicizing 
differences.599 Again, if databases aspire to affect underlying 
behavior and achieve regulatory ends, this is one way to do so. 
In some notable instances, the federal government devotes 
remarkable resources to encourage users to collect and deploy 
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certain data, as in the case of electronic health records (EHRs). 
Through various pieces of legislation,600 Congress not only 
established standards for collecting and using electronic health 
records, but also devoted billions in incentivesan average of 
more than $40,000 per physician.601 
Extending the principle even further, the federal site 
HealthData.gov aggregates over 2,000 unique datasets from 
agencies like the CDC, CMS, FDA, and numerous state and 
local governments.602 The goal is to put open, machine-readable 
data in the hands of programmers, entrepreneurs, journalists, 
providers, scientists, consumers, and other policymakers who 
might, in turn, help improve health care in the United 
States.603 Thus, given the current fascination with “big data,” it 
helps to remember that countless government agencies (and 
Congress) are helping to make data “bigger,” consonant with 
their traditional goal of providing public goods.604 
The next generation of disclosure will thus be more 
collaborative, in the sense that various sectors will both 
contribute to and use the data.605 Indeed, there seems to be 
wide agreement that the government should not have a 
monopoly on generating data,606 but can play an important 
centripetal role in compiling data and helping assure their 
quality. 
CONCLUSION 
Agency databases have proliferated on the belief that 
markets, regulation, and democracy all thrive on 
transparencythat sunlight is the best disinfectant. Ideally, 
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shining a light on things like campaign contributions, 
pollution, and hospital outcomes will encourage more optimal 
behavioror at least deter the worst of it. An added benefit is 
that “regulation by database” avoids the costs and formalities 
of traditional regulation. 
But as transparency has moved onlinebecoming more 
pervasive, more powerful, and more burdened with regulatory 
dimensionswe also must recognize that sunlight can also 
blind or even burn. The case studies demonstrate how 
problems with accuracy, fairness, and efficacy can undermine 
even well-established, well-meaning data regimes. These 
problems can be avoided if agencies act less like passive 
publishers or repositories for data, and more like data stewards 
actively tending to a valuable (and dynamic) public good. 
Policymakers must embrace the government’s role as a 
data steward, a sentinel that helps maximize the quality and 
reliability of data inputs and outputs via administrative 
safeguards. Thinking carefully about publication procedures, 
how to balance the interests of both subjects and users, how to 
present the data accurately and fairly, and how to maximize 
uses by audiences of varying sophistication can be just as 
resource-intensive as traditional regulation. But these steps 
are necessary for data to achieve “regulatory” ends. The more 
reliable government data are, the more they can enlighten us 
and deter unwanted behavior. 
 
